Oscar

That Auster was used for daily commuting plus tug work at the weekends - if the brakes ever got rusty, it'd have to have been landed on a beach, and it wasn't. Since I hand-propped it on occasions, I'm damn glad the brakes weren't U/S.. Great little beast - the only thing I've ever been in where you could tell the revs by what in the cockpit was shaking the crap out of itself. Could have been profitably sponsored by the Chiropractic Association and the Hearing Aid Manufacturer's Group - but hey, when your feet are frozen solid and you can get out and stamp them back into life after landing on a taxiway at Bankstown, who's complaining? (You did NOT hear that from me or indeed anybody, it's an urban myth - ok?).

Sounds like an interesting exercise fellas, but the small market may not warrant the development cost. Are Jabiru's days of innovation behind them? In recent years they seem to have concentrated on refining a few models with similar performance. Their 230 airframe could surely be adapted to suit.

That's a bit misleading - the damn prototype is very much better than roughly built.. Somewhere in the vicinity of half-completed, perhaps.

Blimey. Looks like a pretty damn good effort at picking the 'softest spot' to hit.

Leaks of petrol into the general wing internal area are not good -the foam ribs are not petrol resistant.

Taking a couple of Merv's points and trying to join the dots...

I believe very strongly that 'having a plan of action' firmly in mind is likely to be a major factor in effectively managing an emergency situation. The human mind operates to a very considerable degree on using 'templates' it has established through experience (it's too complicated to discuss in a thread, but the phenomenon of 'deja vu' is regarded as the ultimate connection of an existing 'template' with a particular set of conditions, that makes us think we have been here before..) The closer we are to a 'template' situation, the less likely we are to be discombobulated by a situation in an emergency and we can initiate the correct sequences of actions as a reflex action rather than having to compute the situation. That's what 'training' instills: 'X' happens: do 'Y', and 'Z' is the result.

Having a 'template' established allows us to concentrate on the differences of the specific situation. That's an enormous advantage in terms of the headspace we have (or call it, if you like, 'bandwidth' to manage the situation). If we have 'muscle memory' for things like feeling the aircraft reaction in terms of whether we are headed for an incipient spin in the turn, we have more cognitive space left for selecting the best option for that current situation. More cognitive space = less tendency to freeze from overload.

The idea of having a pre-determined 'turn-back is possible' indicator attached to the altimeter seems to me to be a rather useful idea. We have various speed settings inscribed on the ASI, we are used to checking the instruments before initiating an action. We are (supposedly, at least, although I suspect the ATSB files would show that too many pilots don't do the stuff correctly, or at all) required to make a number of calculation before take-off: W&B, fuel, pressure altitude and temp. T/O distance etc.. I think that setting a 'turn-back option' height indicator indicator on the altimeter would be a damn good exercise that reinforces the EFATO 'template' idea - or in less obscure terms, the 'plan of action' to be followed. Being in a position to 'tick-off' an EFATO response action of 'turn back' as one climbs out, would reduce the decision-making load and the 'oh, sh1t load'. Effectively, it opens up the strip behind one as a 'potential paddock', as Merv has said.

As an aside: with modern electronics, one doesn't need a damn slide rule and a chart to do these calculations, the average 'smart' mobile phone has enough power for apps. that a suitable app. could be developed that spits out the 'set it here' figure - then you add your personal estimate of a fudge factor for your capability, the terrain, etc. Punch in the numbers, think about the actual situation, set the indicator...

Now here's a serious (and not intended to be combative) question for Merv. Merv, you are the CFI of a commercial FTF. Can I take it as accepted that a safe landing that does not damage the aircraft, automatically ensures the safety of the aircraft occupants (apart from, perhaps, flipping their wigs)? In the case of an EFATO, would you rather have: a) the aircraft land in the best possible situation - that being a safe turn-back - or b) landing in a paddock requiring at the minimum expensive retrieval (unless you have a handy trailer..) with likely damage that you have to have repaired at cost to your insurance premiums and loss of income for the aircraft while repairs are carried out, or c): having tried a turn-back with inadequate height and seriously damaged the aircraft and themselves?

A disc of perspex with a line on it and a dob of glycerine to attach it to the altimeter is what - $2.00? An app. for the pilot to easily calculate where to set the line - say $25? The reinforcement of what action to take when the fan stops: maybe not priceless, but what value would you place on it?

My contention is the notion that de rigging and trailering out is an option for us all with the determining factor being 'insufficient landing options in an EFATO". I dont think thats a reasonable option thats available to the majority of pilots.

Sounds glib? - it's worth consideration. If the risk element is too much to accept - whether that because of the terrain, the possible mechanical condition of the aircraft, or even simply an 'I don't think I have the skills to handle an EFATO here', what can one do? It's pretty easy to see the concept of 'I can't just leave it here' becoming the determinant of action, that's pretty natural. If it's a matter of lack of confidence in one's own skills (which I would have, until / unless my power flying skill level is far higher than it is at the moment), probably the first option is to see if someone who DOES have the skills is prepared to fly it out. If one landed at a marginal site because of a mechanical issue - even just a precautionary - the whole ball game is surely elevated to another notch unless you can absolutely guarantee the the 'issue' is 100% sorted. That N.Z. beach (non) take-off is a bit of a classic of having ended up where one wouldn't have wanted to be, and pushing on because the 'problem' was sorted - ignoring the other problems..

I would imagine that your psychologists could identify the likelihood of an extra factor of stress in the case of taking off already primed up with a feeling that 'if anything happens, I'm in deep cacky here'. Maybe it simply sharpens the reflexes, I don't know.

Despite your goading scepticism, Merv, I've HAD my moment of ignoring my better judgement and taking off when I felt very unsure about it, but did it anyway (an HF situation, well before HF was properly considered: fatigue, dehydration and a blazing sinus migraine - I only got in the damn thing because the CFI wanted someone capable to move it to the other strip in a nasty crosswind, and I happened to be standing around, not intending to fly that day anyway). I all but blacked out at 2000 feet, managed to force myself to stay awake long enough to pull full brake and get the thing safely on the ground, and then blacked out before the landing run was completed. I woke up with someone's fingers on my neck shouting 'it's ok, he has a pulse', parked most untidily on the strip but with an undamaged aircraft and an undamaged me.

In my book, you've used up your luck with one instance like that. So yes, if I am seriously concerned about the potential of the take-off, whether that's a result of the airfield situation or weather or mechanical factors, with the knowledge that I have another option available, I will use that option. I am more than happy to be labelled as an overly-cautious old coot than remembered as having ended up as a splat on the ground somewhere.

I have a suitable trailer; I know how to rig and de-rig it. I have spent many hundreds of hours repairing my Jab. I have the mental capacity to calculate the cost of time and effort to retrieve the thing by road vs. paying for the most likely least-cost broken bit (prop, $1500). So don't apply your own thought processes and assume that they are mine, Merv.

So, having a trailer available to move your aeroplane from an unsuitable strip to a more suitable one to facilitate a lower risk takeoff is a realistic option?I don't think I've ever heard if anybody de ringing an aircraft and trailer ing it out because of limited forced landing areas available. Could happen I Spose,;) shall we write that into the syllabus in the new ops manual?

Actually, that's a response worth serious consideration; it raises some quite deep questions about the level of 'risk taking' that ought to be - but it seems to me, too often is not - a factor in decision-making.

Most of us here, I imagine, saw that video of the NZ beach take-off that went awfully wrong, yet done by a pilot who was quite sufficiently competent to have landed the thing very well following an engine-out in a difficult situation. Obviously, I can't say with any certainty whether that pilot would have made a different decision about his proposed take-off had a suitable alternative method of moving the aircraft to a better location been readily available - but a Jabiru isn't a difficult aircraft to remove the wings and trailer out from a location IF the necessary skills to remove the wings and the necessary equipment to load a trailer/truck for said removal is reasonably available. Had that 'option' been on the cards, what resulted in a seriously damaged aircraft with a brand-new engine pretty much totalled might have been a case of no more than some inconvenience and maybe some hundreds of $$ of cost.

At the risk of being unfavorably compared with Mozartmerv's mother, I'd like to bring some glider-based observations into play here.

Gliders are designed, and just about all I know of, have a trailer for road transport. The 'easy' way back into the air from an outlanding is aero-tow. However, one can readily land a glider in a situation where an aero-tow retrieve is not possible. That imposes a load on the retrieve crew: driving to the landing site (which can be hundreds of k's away), loading the thing, towing it home. If you are the pilot, you can expect a hefty bar tab for the retrieve crew - and the thing is ready for flight again the next day.

I've been in the situation of having chosen a paddock from which aero-tow was impossible; the retrieve crew was mighty pissed, until they saw that the alternative I'd foregone was full of cattle that would have, in all probability, damaged the aircraft. My decision was accepted (with thanks, because this was a hire glider that would have been out of action for months had it been stomped on by inquisitive cattle). I've also been in the situation where a road-retrieve was preferable, but the tug pilot decided to try it - and the field was too damn short, he had to hop the Supercub over the fence and I had to hop the glider over it and get it back on the deck so he could rotate and drag us out. It worked on that occasion - but the tug pilot had no idea before he hit the throttle of whether I could handle the situation; it could have easily ended up with two aircraft seriously damaged and potential injuries.

What's the relevance here? Well, I think it is this: if you are in a situation where the evident risks of trying a take-off from a site that is palpably extremely high-risk and other options are available - why do it? If the reason you've ended up in that location is a suspect engine, exposing yourself and your aircraft to the risk is even more stupid. If you've landed in a site that is high-risk for take-off has been simply by choice - then surely your decision-making has been the primary cause of anything that follows and for the sake of the increased premiums that inevitably result from actuarial calculations of a high claim rate, your fellow aviators should beat you to death with a blunt club.

Conclusion? If the risk of taking off from a site is too high - DON'T DO IT. Seek an alternative means to retrieve the aircraft.

For a well-described, real-life description of an EFATO and the pilot's response in a situation where there was no 'best option', only a 'least worst' one available, this is worth a read:

http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2002/jan/14-17.pdf As it happens, it is the prime motivator of my wish to have better restraint in my own (almost identical model) Jab., as I assume that one day I may be forced to select the 'softest spot' for the crash and I'd like to have the feeling of 'this is going to be ugly' rather than 'oh, sh1t, I'm definitely going to die'.

Wedderburn is quite heavily used, and with the ever-reducing availability of airports in the Sydney area, likely to become more so. The local terrain can't be changed or cleared, and as Campbelltown continues to expand, the requirement to turn crosswind from a 35 takeoff early will only get stronger. To me, it looks like a prime location for having a very clear turn-back option point in which one can have confidence established before lining up.

I believe that the phrase 'in which one can have confidence' means, in this case, a combination of confidence that the 'numbers' are correct AND that one can execute the manouever required competently. There's a great deal of information on this thread about both of these aspects that doesn't need repetition.

I have a metal tick in a solid lifter engine, once per rpm, moving prop back and forth it can be repeated, dissappears after 30 deg oil temps

Turning back kills people buddy, show me evidence to the contrary, and Ill eat my hat.

1). Any turn that causes the in-turn wing to stall (and refer to the advice provided to you above re the actual physics of flight loads, it could save your own life) will cause an incipient (at minimum) spin with collateral extra height required to recover and if the ground occurs before the recovery height is expended, a crash ensues.

2) Not every take-off site has non-lethal emergency landing locations within the aircraft's Vbg of +/- 30 degrees at a potential safe turn-back height of straight ahead. Ideal training + experience would provide the PIC with the flying and decision-making skills to select and execute the 'least-worst option' case.

CAMit have a kit to convert hydraulic lifter engines to solids. If you're not 24-reg and stuck with the Jab.-spec engine (and are happy to trade checking the valve clearances for better performance and reliability) then throw in a solid lifter cam and a CAMit kit, and enjoy your flying.

The J120 POH states absolute max. 200C (for 5 minutes max time), max. continuous 180C. Since they're all the same heads, I assume (but admit I don't know for sure) that this is the same across all (fine-finned head, anyway) engines.

Jab. exhaust valves will start to corrode on the stem just below the head quite markedly if run at cht's above about 215, which is very likely to cause fracturing of the head in reasonably short order. Little run time at this sort of cht is required for damage to start to happen, and extended idling in a crosswind can raise some head temps very quickly; if only one cht is fitted to No. 6, the operator may well not realise that the even-side pots (in particular) are running considerably hotter than the single cht instrument is suggesting. That can't fairly be classed as an 'operator fault' but neither is is particularly an 'engine fault' - if the engine is going (unobserved) out of limits on some pots, it ought to be considered a 'consequence' of running out-of-limits.

I believe that the occurrence of cases of in-flight stoppages of Jab engines could be markedly reduced if operators had - and correctly interpreted - full recording of cht and egt performance, on the 'forewarned is forearmed' principle. Being able to read the actual cooling performance of the specific installation and possibly also patterns of use is a pretty damn useful tool for predicting problems that are arising.

The issue isnt weather you can get back. From what height you can in what aeroplane, bla bla. People aren't crashing and dieing by coming up short after turning back. They aren't miss judging the heights, or writing wrong numbers on scribble pads or bits of perspex. They are failing to control the aeroplane when the sh!t hits the fan. AND THATS IT..You can all argue about heights and drawing on your ALT etc all day. But this just shows you are failing to grasp the problem.Does your instructor suddenly grab the aircraft off you while your flying around, stall it savagely and sit back and watch what you do?

Does he suddenly pull the stick back to the stop when your at 100 ft on final? NO, he doesn't. He briefs you, explains whats going to happen. He demonstrates, and you slowly learn the recovery procedure, then and only then do you go onto more advanced manoeuvres. NEVER does this include a sudden, un announced un prepared STALL.

 

The same thing needs to be applied to EFATO's. We as Instructors need to normalise the procedure as much as possible by useing better training techniques then pulling the pin and saying lower the nose. We can do much better.

it is possible to set-up a go/no go criterion for something like a turnback. You have to establish the numbers by testing with you own technique in your own aircraft - and as that has to be done with engine idling, not dead, you need to add about 50% to whatever height loss you come up with in your tests. THIS PROVIDES A NO-GO CRITERION, SO YOU DO NOT WASTE TIME DITHERING, OR TRY AN IMPOSSIBLE TURN-BACK. I am NOT advocating a turn-back, it's just one option, and you need to know immediately whether it's a viable option. I am simply trying to get the decision-making process to be rational and fast.

Turbs:

The 'muscle memory' thing is completely outside things like fuel burn and c/g position: no matter what the current c/g, the 'feeling' that the aircraft is slipping into an incipient is the same, it's just happening at a different airspeed. I've been aerotowed out at a too-low speed in a glider with an (inadvertently) an aft of c/g limit situation, it was like trying to control a dodgem car with liquorice between the steering wheel and the front wheels. It's completely a sensory input to the fact that the inside aileron has ceased to add a load to the stick. If I were developing a training sylabus, I'd include the Stolspeed video; (s) of separation (e.g. http://www.stolspeed.com/id/4) and then follow that up with practical demonstrations of it happening. More or less like explaining tyre slip angle, and then taking the learner-driver out onto a skid-pan so they understand the feeling of exceeding best slip angle.

I disagree that every landing in a glider is a forced landing; unless you've seriously stuffed-up your planning, it's an arrival at a destination point following a decision. I've had a few 'outlandings' - by design and by circumstance - and my personal limit for decision was 1000 feet AGL and no lift (though I've squirmed out on a thermal on the turn to base..), whereas Ingo Renner's was probably just above 'I can touch the ground, time to give it away'. An EFATO in a conventional lightie is, I imagine, absolutely no decision about the fact that you are going to land somewhere on the ground you can see around you; however it seems to me that the more confidence (with reason!) you have in your ability to get the aircraft to a desired place for a landing, the more options you (may) have.

I don't know if this observation from my gliding experience carries through to power aircraft, since I simply don't have the power flying experience to judge, so please take it as a comment intended to perhaps assist the debate and nothing more. If I'm wrong - then again, please debate it in the spirit of the thread.

In gliders, one spend a lot of time turning fairly tightly at very close to the stall, in thermals that can be quite rough air. If in a gaggle, you simply can't afford to watch the instruments, you watch the other gliders close to you and rely very much on sensory input, including the aileron load on the stick, the audio output of the vario, the yaw string, the noise of airspeed around the cockpit and a general sense of the steepness of the turn in relation to the horizon. You also tend to develop an ability to sense the difference between flight load pressure on the bum and acceleration pressure from flying in and out of the rising air.

I have no idea whether this is a correct description, but for want of a better term, a lot of glider flying (in thermals, at least) becomes a matter of muscle memory: the moment that the ailerons become 'too light', indicating that you have lost the aerodynamic effect of the inner aileron and you're slipping into an incipient spin, invokes a 'kick it straight and ease the stick forward' response without (seemingly, at least) any actual decision-making interruption to your concentration on everything else around you. The more sensitive the glider, the less demand it makes on your consciousness; I've been put in a new type to me ( in that case, a Libelle H201) and found it completely 'at home' within the first 5 minutes of the first thermal.

What relevance does this have to EFATO and turn-back? - I'm not sure. However, it seems to me that irrespective of the other decision-making needed (adequate height, current conditions, landing options etc.), if one has the confidence - which can only, surely, be gained from experience - that one can fly the damn thing without having to check the ASI, the T&B for rate etc. and do calculations, one has more 'headspace' for making the other critical decisions. More 'headspace' has to, surely, reduce the 'panic' factor and possibly, at least, allow more opportunity to make calculated responses to the situation. Surely, if you don't HAVE to live within the cockpit, you have more space to assess what's outside the cockpit..

The term 'overload' is often used in a derogatory sense, to suggest that an individual doesn't have the capacity to process multiple intellectual inputs - and therefore reach sensible conclusions - adequately. That's unfair: everybody has an 'overload' point. The effect of 'overload' is not dissimilar to the effects of alcohol. Many years ago, Prof. Sid Lovibond did a series of tests of racing drivers vs. average drivers under the influence of alcohol - and found that a racing driver ( i.e. a highly experienced and competent driver) was more adept at reacting appropriately to emergency situations when at .08 intoxication than the average driver when stone cold sober! I believe that a major part of that was a result of the experienced driver concentrating on 'where do I need to be, at what attitude, to not have an accident?' because he/she knew and did not have to even think about what physical inputs were needed to achieve that situation. It's stuff like 'how long on the brakes to reduce speed, then get off them to allow adhesion for swerving, and then how to avoid the scenery'. By comparison, I've seen people who - literally - couldn't walk across a pedestrian crossing while talking on their mobile phones without losing the plot...

It seems to me that a successful resolution of an EFATO ends up being able to put the aircraft in the right place to land without catastrophic results (or, if there is no available alternative, to select the option that presents the lowest available risk factor). The less demand on the PIC to devote decision making to maintaining control of the aircraft, the more 'headspace' should be available for calculating the best option to follow.

From my very limited experience of power flying, it seems to me that training to recognise straight-ahead stalls is taken as sufficient, whereas it isn't straight-ahead stalls that kill, but turns that develop into spins. Do we have entirely the wrong emphasis in the training requirements?

Surely, the AGL criterion needs to be varied according to terrain? For instance, if taking off from Mittagong (YMIG) on 24 with a bit of headwind, you could get to 600 AGL fairly quickly- and before the curl-over from the hill south of the 24 runway, but the turn back would have you end up in the downwash, dumping you on the ground rather sooner than a simple climb gradient/glide gradient calculation would indicate?

Back in the day, a friend of the family owned a Citabria on floats which he kept at his waterfront home on Pittwater, and could 'tack' between the moored boats to get to clear water for take-off. He wasn't interested on the aerobatics capability, but the general competence of the beast was quite sufficient to make it viable personal transport for a waterfront home in a crowded location. A great little beast, provided you did the u/c leg attachment mods to stop them failing.

Nick, if you're thinking of a 'cheap', high-time GA aircraft, it'd be a very sound idea to talk to a Part 21M engineer about things like the fatigue life of components and repair costs of the aircraft involved. I think you can 'stretch' the life of a Lycosaurus via 'on inspection', but if the mainspar is about up to its hours, then I doubt you can do anything but replace it - if replacements are available. There's a reason why you see apparently undamaged older aircraft sitting forlornly on the edges of airports with weeds growing up through the control surfaces...

Also, the cost of maintaining an older, stressed-skin and rivets construction GA-type is not cheap; not only is it very, very labour-intensive work but you have to use release materials / have a Part 21M engineer prepare a repair scheme in some cases - that may include analysis of the original material if manufacturer's documentation is not available. Replacing a cast component that is not longer in production (such as say a spar end fitting) could become a nightmare. A VH-Ex reg. homebuilt is another story entirely, so an RV might be a serious contender if you pick the right model.

A mate of mine has been doing up a Victa Airtourer for the past about eight years now (does bits when he has assembled some more funds..) and for complexity, by comparison to a Jab 230 / 430, it's a ridiculously complex aircraft with a massive parts-count. On the plus side for him it'll be aerobatic, which the Jab cannot be - but for general getting-around-the-place use, the Jab. is just streets ahead. The Victa was built before NC machining, which means just about every damn part was basically hand-machined - and there are small but appreciable tolerance differences between parts that means ANY replacement part has to be hand-made to fit the specific aircraft.

You might want to also investigate insurance costs in your 'due diligence' of the operating budget.

All of that aside: I reckon that IF you pick the right model and example of a suitable GA aircraft, your basic point is correct: but rushing in to buy, say, a slightly-dented, high-time Traumahawk (for instance) may leave you in a vale of tears and a life doomed to tinkering in the hangar for more hours than you spend flying. It'd be a bit like finding a tired Jaguar E-type in a farmer's shed for less money than you'd have to pay for a somewhat-used Mazda MX-5: if you're into the restoration bit, the end result would be a wonderful (if vastly expensive) thing - but you'd miss out on a hell of a lot of fun driving in the sunshine to interesting places with no fears that you'd have to be towed to complete your journey.

Oops, my mistake in typing - those stats. are for hours flown, not miles - I got it right one time out of two.. now edited that post, thanks for the heads-up there!