Oscar

Just having a look at the accident rate statistics in the Attachment to the Truss Review report and there's a point to ponder: over the last 6 years, RAA aircraft had 1.7 times the rate of crashes/million hours flown than private GA.

 

The rate of fatal accidents per million hours flown was almost identical for private G.A. and RAA.

 

However: the ratio of fatal to total accidents was about 17% for private G.A. and 9% for RAA aircraft.

 

It's a bit of a long bow to draw the conclusion that RAA aircraft are fairly decent in terms of 'survivability', let alone to go any further with that line of reasoning and talk about things like structural integrity and lower impact energy etc. but it would be interesting (to say the least) if some deeper analysis could be done of the injury/fatal rate per accident by RAA class aircraft manufacturer / model of aircraft. The NRMA does something similar derived from actual crash statistics for cars. It would be too crude an analysis to draw any strong conclusions but it might indicate general trends.

 

 

have u heard any other news regarding brs systems for the jabs oscar.a fellow i speak to from sth australia on facebook has a 160 is upgrading or changing over from another type,and has had no problems with his motors and is very happy with the aircraft.my interest in the brs is purely from structural failure ,collision etc side of things

Jeff, I have exactly zero information about installing a BRS in a Jab., so can't help you there. However, I do know that some serious work is being done to establish the fatigue life of (I'm pretty sure) the J160 at the moment and that should be finished fairly soon, I believe. As far as I am aware - and Jab. are really the people to be handling this, or at least the various regulatory bodies around the world responsible for aircraft safety, apart from one possible case in France that has been speculated as having a number of causes, there haven't been any significant structural failures in Jabs. Collision - yep, I agree, a BRS is the only option.

 

Between the legs throttle mount.......I'm guessing there is some serious redesign required there to support the arresting of 9G of forward acceleration of a pilot for a component that if subject to 9G might just about top 1G equiv of 5Kgs...if that.Andy

Andy - in my idea for installing a six-point harness, the only load on the cross-beam the throttle mounts on would be the anti-submarining straps, the actual lap restraint points would remain the original ones. I've only looked at anLSA55, so I can't comment on how this idea might fit into other model Jabs., but in the LSA55 construction, at first blush it appears a viable arrangement. However, it is very much something of a work to be 'in progress' sometime in the future and I'll be working it through with a Part 21M engineer who knows the LSA55 structure in every detail, so iot certainly won't be just a case of drilling a couple of holes and hoping for the best!

 

 

I can't comment at all on an EFATO turn-back scenario, but I can comment on some of the things we were taught (and DID learn, and apply - because whether it's a bang-off or a full actual break, the end result is the same - you end up back on the ground) about cable breaks.

 

First reaction - and when your feet are at about or above your face, you really do understand the imperative - push the stick forward, all the way, fast. In a Blanik with first-stage flap, you won't hesitate - the thing feels as if it's going to fall backwards. You had one hand on the cable release already, so you pulled that as the opposite movement to the stick.

 

Then you hold the stick fully forward as the earth comes back into view and continue to hold it forward and centralised until you can feel your bum back down on the seat. It takes quite sufficient time for that to happen for you to have a look forwards and decide what options you have, and also - by eye - what height you have to (possibly) turn in. By the time you've got the weight back on the bum you should have sorted whether to go straight or turn, so it's either keep the nose travelling down and pull brake and full flap for a forward descent, a variation of that if the bug-out landing spot is beyond the threshold, or check airspeed and carefully start your turn - and if the ailerons feel too light, kick the bugger straight and centre the stick immediately, then re-commence with some more speed in hand.

 

By the time you've done about 90 degrees of turn, the rest of the way down becomes pretty clear to plan and execute.

 

 

[ and as far as I know Jabiru haven't yet released a 'sloshing' compound that will protect the tanks against some of the more aggressive aromatics in some PULPs. /QUOTE]Jabiru recommended I use Kreem sloshing compound, bought from a local motorbike shop - I did my 65 litre tank form the UL 450. Laurie

Laurie - that's a damn good start - have Jabiru 'officially' released it as a SB? I'm very keen to find out, as I also have a 65-litre tank that I am concerned about. Sloshing compounds have somewhat of a chequered history, the ideal would be, I reckon, an aromatic-resistant-resin based tank replacement, but so far I've only found one that claims decent performance. However, a decent sloshing compound and a good gascolator ought to be a reasonable half-way house answer - if you keep an eye on what drains out of the gascolator!

 

 

Very true - but it looks as if all the Avgas production on the East Coast has / will likely cease, so we may be reliant on imported - and if that happens, my guess is that increasingly it won't be available at locations other than major G.A.-centric sites, which are off-limits to most RAA aircraft. One of the attractions of RAA-class aircraft is - to me at least - the relatively low-cost ability to go adventuring 'off the beaten track' in terms of airfields, and the availability of Avgas is likely to constrict very much to 'on the beaten track'. If we want to have geographical freedom, we're going to have to be able to use other than Avgas at times, so setting up our aircraft to have tolerance of, at a minimum, 95 ULP is very likely to be of practical benefit.

 

On that point: in more remote locations, the actual RON that comes out of the pump nozzle is less likely to be 98 than what the bowser says, because of the rate of evaporation of the aromatics that are needed to get to 98 RON with both time and elevation. As we've discussed many times - getting your cooling right and having decent cht and egt monitoring will become even more essential if you want to venture beyond the area of supply of Avgas.

 

 

01rmb: great post, and very useful in advancing the discussion, I believe. You've highlighted a very important factor: fuel and the correlation with the way the engine is operated. I reckon your point that: One thing is certain though - if the problem is not identified and fixed then the engine will fail should be inscribed on every aircraft operator's heart - gold award for expressing the bleedin' obvious that some of the trenchant critics of Jabiru engines seem to wish to ignore.

 

Can I make a couple of quick points?

 

Jaburi specifically advise against extended idle on the ground times, with good reason: the cooling airflow through the ram-air ducts is minimal at idle, and in crosswind conditions the downwind side (in particular) can actually experience negative airflow - i.e. no damn cooling of the pots on the downwind side at all! It's worse on the pax. side of the engine, with the prop 'retreating' across the cowl opening - and in a 3300, if only one cht is installed on pot 6, you have about the worst cht reporting situation you can have. Pot 6 tends to run the coolest of all on a 3300, so if holding across wind with the wind on your port side, you have the worst possible cooling situation for pots 1, 3 and 5. Then, one goes to full power for take-off at zero airspeed with one set of pots already very hot: you can see the potential for EFATO right up front! And that's no criticism of the operator: if you have to hold in a busy situation, who is going to feel comfortable about turning into wind to hold and then having to take-off without a clear picture of what's in the circuit? I'm buggered if I would, and if down at the pointy end of the runway I like to see what's incoming. So it's a juggling act at the best: managing engine temps vs. managing to fit into the traffic pattern. On that issue, it's also worth considering that proper management of the engine oil temp. situation requires some idling time, and an optimum oil cooler installation for operation in hot conditions will take some time at idle to come up to proper temps - a TOCA is very desirable to assist in getting the oil to operating temp quickly without extended idling.

 

Re using PULP: the aromatics in some PULPs have a known adverse affect on Jab. fuel tanks: check the 'Jabachat' http://www.jabiru.net.au/jaba-chat-a-news for June 2013 for more info. For older Jabs., using some PULPs can affect the fuel pump (the old 'Repco' pump can't handle ethanol, and very probably some of the PULPs as well), and as far as I know Jabiru haven't yet released a 'sloshing' compound that will protect the tanks against some of the more aggressive aromatics in some PULPs. I suspect (but others with more complete knowledge may be able to help) that 95 unleaded may be a safer bet than 98. The obvious corollary here is that the lower the RON, the more chance of detonation with very bad results - but as you suggest, full engine cht and egt monitoring is the first line of defence..

 

Nev: Valve guide wear is absolutely (as you said) affected by rocker geometry - including rocker bush wear - and also material, in terms of its ability to transfer heat. No doubt I'll be flamed as a CAMit tragic for this comment, but all of those elements are subjects of current CAMit developments. More information and results of current real-life testing will be forthcoming in the near future.

 

 

Every time a Jab engine stopping in flight is mentioned on a thread, that thread turns into a tribal fighting ground. In most - but thankfully not all - cases, the end result adds sod-all to helping us gain real understanding of the causes of the stopping.

 

The original post was a very good one - it bought out several important points: firstly, that by good airmanship and decision making, an in-flight incident did NOT become an accident with injuries or worse to the people involved. Great work on the part of all involved.

 

Secondly, that it is recognised that the actual use pattern of the engine is unknown and is (likely, at least) to be at the minimum a part of the 'story' of why this engine ceased to run. As usual, we have a mix of possible causes, and despite the positions that 'opposing' sides typically take (in this case, Jabiru more than likely saying it is down to operation and others saying it is down to poor design / components), the answer is extremely likely to be an interaction of both elements.

 

That Jab. engines - particularly 2200s - have more in-flight stopping than is reasonable, is unarguable. That there are a range of improvements that can be made to make them more robust is not just obvious but is the basis of the business case for the CAMit and Rotec developments. However, a powerplant's mechanical performance is only part of a 'system' of propulsion that includes not just the bits of metal (and wood) whizzing around but the cooling, fuel and factors of operation. A serious 'out of expected condition' for which the engine was designed can cause a stopping event - and not all of those could reasonably be deemed to be a 'failure' i.e.: Failure is the state or condition of not meeting a desirable or intended objective. If the limits of the objective have been defined and those limits are exceeded, then the engine stopping is a consequence - not a failure.

 

This is not just petty semantics; we accept the existence of standards for just about every aspect of our lives. For example: car brakes have limits of effectiveness in retarding velocity. If crash avoidance requires that the brakes would have to exceed their design parameters, hitting something isn't a 'brake failure' provided they have performed as designed.

 

If we try to look at the situation of Jabiru engine stoppages objectively it is apparent that they need a closely-controlled operating environment. The most critical of these factors is effective cooling in all operational conditions. It's fair comment to suggest that this is an area with a high potential for problems in the case of Jab. engines: a quick wander through the 'Jab. Cooling' thread: http://www.recreationalflying.com/threads/jabiru-engine-cooling.112581/ will show just how tricky it can be to get it right. That's a recognised fact in the industry: Lycoming audit factory installations and won't provide a warranty unless you get their company 'tick' of approval - and of course, G.A. installations do not allow ANY little tinkering under the cowl that isn't tested and approved.

 

A major impediment to the objective development of useful analysis of Jabiru engine stoppages has been the lack of any effective monitoring and recording (in too many cases) of operation. A single cht and egt reporting set-up is quite simply only marginally more useful than nothing - and in most cases, we know that the standard cht probe on a Jab. engine is often placed in the worst position for reporting the peak cht, which tends to wander around amongst pots anyway depending on airspeed and engine load. Both cooling duct performance and fuel distribution affect this, and it's London to a brick that there are a considerable number of operators who have watched their gauges assiduously without being able to tell that a different pot to the one being monitored was cooking itself. You can't be expected to know what is happening to your engine if there is nothing telling you! Those of us old enough to remember when cars changed over from oil pressure gauges to warning lights will remember the old mantra: the oil-pressure warning light is there to tell you that something ugly HAS happened, while the gauge used to tell you that it is on the way to happening..

 

If I were a commercial operator of a Jabiru engine, I'd absolutely install a full set of gauges feeding into an EMIS with a recording facility. The cost of that vs. the cost of a full rebuild at way less than the expected TBO is a no-brainer - and that of course isn't taking into account any cost for a forced landing and resulting damage to the airframe over and above the engine re-build cost.

 

Thanks to Thirsty, we will hopefully get a full report on the findings of the strip-down, which may provide some clues as to the exact condition of the 'broken' bit/s, from which likely cause/s can be deduced. If that engine had a full recorded history of cht's and egt's, it's easy to see how much more additional information would be available to really track down the cause/s.

 

 

What's the "G" loading specified for restraint points? About 20? Nev

For aircraft certificated under BCAR S, it's only 9.0 forwards, 4.5 upwards, 4.5 downwards and 3.0 sideways. As you will appreciate, that's not a real lot; I suspect (but state that I have nothing more than a suspicion here rather than fact to support the contention) that the nature of the Jab. primary structure provides a fair amount of 'boing' flexibility that reduces the ultimate occupant shock load at impact on the harness points. As we all know, it's not just actual loads but the rate of rise of the application of the load that is important and your chances of injury are magnified if you are being tossed around unrestrained...

 

 

Id pay for proper harness in jab, whats the plan?Reducing risk may involve more basic upgrades than BRS or air bag belts or really basic stuff like 1 hr a month practice forced landings

JJ, the plan is to use the existing shoulder and lap harness points, plus add the (fifth and sixth) anti-submarining straps both sides of the throttle lever. That means the main restraint loads will be carried out by the existing points, so no re-working of the structural elements should be required. The plan also includes adding anti-whiplash headrests as part of the shoulder harness mods., and I've been working with a proper aero-engineer on the basics so it all looks entirely possible (at this stage, anyway) and not too dramatic for a Part 21M engineer to approve - but I'm looking to develop it as a basically bolt-in kit, so you'll understand if I don't provide too much more detail. FIA race-approved harnesses meet (actually, slightly exceed in the shoulder-straps) the FAA requirements, and with lightweight cam-lock buckles provide an inverted release capability.

 

We have a heap of work to complete and a rather massive EO to have approved before I can get onto this particular exercise, and I've only been looking at our LSA55 so far, so I reckon maybe 12 months before I have anything to show, but for what it's worth, I've built up a test version and with a 75mm straps-harness, you most certainly feel vastly more 'restrained'. The downside is that you won't be able to access anything in your shirt pockets, unless they are on the sleeves. The standard LSA55 harness points lend themselves admirably to the change-over, but the headrests are frankly necessary to ensure that the assembly does not introduce any new dangers, so while the basic idea is simple, it needs very thorough consideration - and that includes ensuring that one can reach all controls easily when properly strapped-in.

 

 

Well, that's a pity - but kudos is still due to Ole for making a serious effort!

 

 

Well, that IS impressive! Ohlins are the best of the best (not Chinese manufactured to the specification of a Perth-based entrepreneur, but developed from the cream of motorcycle racing).

 

Presumably, you can tell us what the results were against JAR-VLA 473?

 

 

It's very much a case of what parts of the body are going to be taking the stress - and that depends very much on the structure . When I used to race cars, I once watched a mate go off track almost beside me and into a concrete retaining wall, hitting it at at least 70 mph, about 75 degrees to the face. I saw the car rise up about three feet at the back, and I felt very sick in the stomach, I was sure he was dead or very seriously injured. It was a space-frame type chassis with NO crumple factor -home built (Lotus-7 type car). They dragged the car back to the pits at the end of the race and my mate was sitting in it; when he got out, he had two cherry-red bruises already formed from the shoulder-harness ( and probably across the hip bones too, but none of us were seeking that level of information) - no other damage! And that was with the old 50mm-wide harness. I have to mention that we were ALWAYS strapped in so damn tightly that we couldn't move the harness off the chest with a serious pull on the straps - scrutineers checked that in the pits before we were allowed out onto the grid. You felt as if you'd been riveted in.

 

In a low-wing aircraft, if your tailbone is perched right above a mainspar on a seat with no energy dissipation capability and with a short u/c anyway where the likely rate of rise of compression loading is very high, you need to hope that the seat is something better than a thin shell so it doesn't bend around the spar if it's vertical impact. If you have decent forward momentum, then submarining under the lap belt can do serious spinal chord damage, and if the stick is between your legs you're looking at anything from major unpleasantness to a whole lot of cracked/crushed bones in areas that you'd really rather not have that damage. A couple of cracked ribs would be vastly preferable - as long as they don't perforate a lung.

 

Personally, I believe that the standard lap-sash harness is useful to keep you in the seat in turbulence, but not much more. When one looks at the dynamics of crash testing, there are a whole lot of twisting/ body-mass flailing about stresses put on the body that it isn't genetically engineered to withstand. Effective restraint can go a vast way to minimising damage: have a look at this motor-racing crash: http://garagemonkey.com/peg/2010-03-07/3353/mark-webber-mercedes-backflip-crash-le-mans-1999-youtube . No airbags involved there! However, I have to add a caveat: if a four, five or six-point harness is not properly engineered - as evidenced in the Sting Goulburn crash, where the four-point harness shoulder attachments were so demonstrably shonky that the company and distributor should have ended up in Court on criminal charges, then you are flying with a PR myth, not actual safety.

 

As for BRS systems: once you pull the handle, you abrogate control. I accept that there are situations in which control is not possible (mechanical/structural/ control system failure), or a potential landing situation where control would have nil helpful effect. Most of those situations are manageable by: rigorous attention to maintenance, flying conservatively, early and good decision-making. While you have control,you can execute damage-limitation strategies; once under the canopy, it's sit back and hope the ride is going to be ok.

 

 

I think that deserves a big 'good one' to Ole for that; Jabs. bounce fairly well but don't have much if anything of deformation of the seat area, which (particularly in the LSA55-cabined ones) is a concern because there isn't room to even add a decent layer of suitable foam (temper-foam or good quality 'memory foam' (and many types of foam are NOT suitable and may in fact increase your injuries!) 160 and 230's, I think can accommodate some for all but the largest pilots; however, on balance, I'd rather be dissipating the energy on horizontal deceleration rather more than vertical deceleration, even if it means having to select the softest spot ahead of you that you are going to run into.

 

 

We in the VRA (the busiest rescue organisation in NSW) regularly encounter undeployed airbags. Sticking your head into a crashed vehicle is a damned dangerous activity. People underestimate the violence in an inflating airbag, perhaps because we see movies of them deploying in slow motion. When we have set them off in training it's like firing a 12 guage shotgun next to your head.

Yep, and could drive your head right through the stick, flap handle etc. - or in an inverted low-wing aircraft, possibly break your neck / back on the door sill.

 

Also, a point re BRS chutes - if the aircraft does not meet decent standards for both the u/c drop test (which it should) AND you have decent spine protection in the seat (which I don't think any ultralights go even close to meeting, at least for the FAA standard), you could end up in worse shape than from a ride through the trees and bushes shedding wings and undercarriage along the way. There's a not silly argument for using the weight of extra fuel for flying over more forgiving terrain than relying on the BRS to save the day over bad terrain.

 

 

Jabs have a remarkably good occupant protection cell, all things considered. We've seen in the reasonably recent past two examples of ones that have had the firewall ripped out with no more damage to the occupant than a few scratches; the damage to the one that went into the trees at Wedderburn years ago was amazingly comprehensive yet both occupants were able to clamber out in reasonable shape, that one in New Zealand that cartwheeled while trying to take off a beach was pretty dramatic, plenty of them end up with their legs in the air without much more damage to the occupant(s) than them being shaken and stirred..

 

Airbag head protection might be useful, though it needs to be carefully designed so that it doesn't crush the spine if in a weird position. A motorcyclist air-bag jacket might be a feasible option. However, for my money, I'd rather have a five or six-point harness with decent 75mm straps holding me in securely to the basic occupant cage that Jab provides, and the Jab design lends itself rather well to being modified for that ( I'm working on such a mod. for my own Jab. to do that at the moment, and it will be approved by a Part 21M engineer for installation in a 55-reg aircraft before it goes in). Total weight increase for the installation should come out around 3 - 3.5kgs.

 

As a small, but important consideration with airbags: in the event of crash, an unfired airbag is recognised by safety organisations ( e.g. SES, RFS, Ambulance etc.) as a major hazard for recovery personnel working inside the cabin area of vehicles and there are very strict guidelines about occupant recovery procedures - hence the common occurrence of the vehicle being cut open before the occupants are removed. A small aircraft is a far more difficult cabin area for recovery personnel to work in than most vehicles. I believe the same goes for unfired BRS installations.

 

 

Ironically you started your post out with "Generalisations!!" .....

You really should get used to Carbon Fiber because it's coming right now in many big ways into most people's lives, don't be afraid.

Your fundamental lack of understanding of both the primary and secondary nature of the material would be hilarious, if there weren't a serious side - sec0ndary safety of c/f structures. Being able to look up Wiki articles and regurgitate them as your own knowledge doesn't cut it, sunshine.

 

c/f is a superb material, right up to the point where it isn't, and beyond that point it's as useful as a chocolate hammer. No, that's unfair - if you're being 'protected' by a c/f structure, you'd be better off with a chocolate hammer, because at least it won't tear you to shreds.

 

 

Then, FFS, someone tell Millard to STFU before RAA is paying lawyers to sort out the mess.

 

 

Complete horse manure in regard to aircraft design. The only primary structure c/f motor racing vehicles are F1 cars, and they have to meet destructive test requirements that cost- literally - millions of $$ for compliance.

 

This is just another example of the self-serving disinformation that you spread to a hoped-for market. Or, in short form - a con-job. But of course, there are people who know your past in that regard.

 

 

Let's not muck around here - either Clayton was 'dismissed' by decision/agreement of the Board - as stated unequivocally by Millard - or he resigned for his own reasons.

 

If the first proposition is true, then the statement by the Chairman vice the Board is at the best ingenuous and basically deceitful to the membership. If the second is true, then the direct imputation of some sort of deficiency in the discharge of his duties is very probably legally actionable - at cost, I suspect, to RAA - and an example of the utter lack of fitness of its promulgator to be in any position of responsibility in the RAA.

 

The situation is no damn joke. As aircraft owners and operators, we are constrained to the RAA - yet it seems as if either: a) it cannot recruit and retain quality staff - except, it would seem, by happy accident; or b) the 'democratic' requirement for election of the controlling body - the Board - ensures the election in some cases of people who would be manifestly incompetent to run a pay-per-squat ablution facility in Uzbechistan.

 

Which is it? We need to know, because we need to change the paradigm.

 

 

The Stratos is not a genuine contender because it has serious fundamental aerodynamic problems. The website promoting it is another piece of hopeful bovine fertiliser foisted on the public. Websites and bovine fertiliser are cheap tricks. A genuine, safe, cheap and good-performing aircraft is not a cheap trick.

 

A re-vamped Sapphire is a contender - if there is a genuine market for a single-place touring aircraft.

 

 

If it's a Jabiru engine and prop, use the beleville washers and the Jabiru recommended torque. A great deal of experimentation went into the development of that specification and nobody other than Jabiru has any proper idea of the reason why that is the correct and best solution to the specific engine and prop. There is WAY too much hangar gossip factor involved in varying from the manufacturer's specification - and ALL of that is personal opinion that is NOT backed by rigorous testing.

 

The Jabiru solution IS backed by rigorous testing. HOWEVER: ensure that the nylocs you use are AN items, not Bunnings OTS crap. And - make sure that the torque wrench you use is accurate, because the pre-load on the beleville washers has been very, very carefully calculated to provide the required friction co-efficient between the prop and the flange while having the compliance to accommodate variations in the moisture content of the prop wood in the range of expected conditions in Australia.

 

 

We had a considerable discussion on the theme of 're-locating the RAA HQ' recently, and the idea that location is somehow more important than efficiency of operation was thrashed around. I believe it remains the case that RAA operation does not NEED to be considered primarily on the basis of location (though reasonable proximity of some senior staff to CASA is probably a good idea). With proper system development, RAA could operate perfectly well as a de-centralised administrative entity using electronic communication.

 

That would, in turn, allow the recruitment of staff without the question of location becoming a paramount consideration, and I suggest would go a long way to ensure retention of staff: how attractive would it be to have a job you can take with you if you want/need to move? I'd reckon that alone would be worth quite a bit as an 'unpaid' inducement to join RAA staff and do your best to make sure you continued to be a valued member of staff.

 

The idea that RAA NEEDS a prominent HQ is, quite frankly, an expensive exercise in symbolism and one that the exposure of RAA finances at Natfly suggests is likely to be untenable for very long. No matter where such an HQ would be located, it remains highly unlikely that anything but a small percentage of members would ever a) need, and b) be likely to, actually visit the HQ in person. I am very, very sure that the general population do NOT walk past a fancy RAA sign on a fancy office somewhere and think: 'well, those little aircraft people certainly have their game well under control, let's all support them'.

 

How much of our membership fees - which are rather high, frankly, for the actual effort required per member for administration of RAA affairs - is it worth to have a centralised HQ anywhere? In terms of ROI, bricks-and-mortar infrastructure is not really worth much at all vs. the ROI of a properly-developed, effective and efficient administrative system that could be operated almost entirely in a de-centralised model.

 

To take the concerns raised above, and assuming that Clayton was indeed the CEO we all hoped he would be, whose sole reason for resigning was the Canberra location: with the arrangements I am suggesting, he could have returned to his family and the effect on RAA operation would have been zero - he could have continued to do the job entirely effectively having packed up his desk on Friday afternoon in Canberra and walked into his home office on Monday morning near Brisbane (actually, I believe he had lived fairly close to Toowoomba ) and turned on his office computer. Instead of which, we go yet again through the recruitment dance, the disruption of another new person having to learn the ropes, the loss of corporate knowledge, etc. etc., because of location.

 

Given the current state of RAA finances, frankly the whole idea of spending money on re-location is idiotic. We are looking at a time-line to either bankruptcy or very much inflated fees of at best three years; spending money on an out-dated idea that serves almost no useful tangible purpose is, to use a sailor's phrase, 'pissing into the wind'.

 

 

There are a number of planes (and cars and boats) and kits constructed with no fancy tooling at all, Morgan's technique is but one example known to many here.There are many ways to achieve results, there is no "You have to do it this way" in my book. Follow mainstream thinking and you'll probably end up one of the 90%+ of business failures - who follow mainstream thinking.

All very flippant and glib. However, if you have to meet accepted standards, then you have to either use accepted design criteria, materials and processes or be prepared to provide the proof of 'alternative compliance' required by the authorising authority. You can build an aircraft from string and vaseline if you wish, but pretending it is equivalent to something that has demonstrated compliance with all the relevant standards (and the operational word here is 'relevant', which depends on the requirements for operation) unless you have the necessary approval/s, is a con job.

 

 

In all seriousness, a better understanding of the potential problems with recovery that cause additional damage to aircraft that have ended up inverted is worth the discussion.

 

We should all be aware that insurance premiums are calculated on the basis of profit to the insurance company on pay-outs vs. premiums over the 'pool' of premiums. If the cost of repair of an aircraft is inflated by post-crash damage due to inept recovery, everybody's premium rises. In the case of my own aircraft , the insurance assessment was that is was a write-off with a small residual salvage value only. (My co-owner and I purchased it as a 'basket case' from someone who had purchased it from the Insurance Company for salvage value; we had the skills and motivation to return it to the air).

 

Having assessed the actual damage, it was evident that the damage incurred from a really unenlightened recovery effort was in all probability the tipping factor in it being written-off vs. repaired. To be realistic, a full-commercial-cost repair effort done by suitably approved persons says that the Insurance assessment was correct. I would estimate - based on the work we have done - that the additional damage done by a ham-fisted recovery effort has taken in realistic terms about $6 - $8K of materials and (mostly) time at L2 rates, when the necessity for a Part 21M engineer to develop a repair scheme is included. Admittedly, this is for a 55-reg aircraft that must meet specific standards. I assume that for a 19-reg or VH-exp. aircraft, the the builder can just do what he or she considers appropriate. For non-exp VH reg aircraft, it has to be kosher or nothing.

 

One way or another, if the recovery of your aircraft causes additional damage to that incurred in the initial accident, you - and the rest of the insured aircraft community - are going to meet an increased insurance bill. It is absolutely worth trying to ensure that no additional damage to that first incurred happens in the recovery phase.

 

 

George Markey was convinced that nobody in Australia had the capability of actually producing the Ultrabat MkII to the correct process for the materials, though we had a spirited discussion (the only sort with George..) when I suggested that McConaghy Boats probably could, since they are world experts in large c/f structures. However, his concerns shouldn't be ignored (in regard to the 'Bat, anyway) - it would take a considerable facility with well-established process control capability to get the strength/weight results reliably. C/F construction has become a bit more tolerant with newer developments, but as far as I understand it, it's still not something you can expect to knock out in the back shed.. so the hope for 'cheap AND good' is probably going to be difficult to meet.