Oscar

If you have a raw prawn problem, I would reckon its operator error. You need to apply the prawns to a significant source of heat to exite the molecules and "cook" them.Im sure its in the manual somewhere..

Oscar, the fuel isn't in the wings its behind the passenger seat. Tornados use an inline filter either on the end of the fuel pipe that sits just off the bottom of the tank or an inline one and feeds directly into the fuel pump.Trust me on this Oscar, it was the engine not the fuel tap that caused the plane to crash.

There's no fuel shut off valve in a tornado, its a drain.

I don't even LIKE rum, Merv - though I could almost move to Bundy just for ready access to the local prawns....

And, after some consideration, some distance to some of the totally raw prawns in my current locality.

Stopping on takeoff, in spec? ...We differ in opinion there..:)

The engine examination did not reveal any evidence of a malfunction or failure.

I quote the evidence presented, Merv. You are, as always, at liberty to place your view of the facts for the consideration of the forum members. I would expect nothing less!

another one where the Jab lost powerhttp://aircrashed.com/cause/cERA09LA356.shtml

Not a Jab airframe, which is the subject of this run of postings. Also, the engine was tested post-crash:

The engine started on the first attempt. White smoke was initially observed from the exhaust, which cleared in two to three seconds. The engine ran smoothly and without hesitation. A total of four engine runs were performed, each approximately two to three minutes in duration. A peak engine speed of 2,830 RPM was achieved with normal oil pressure readings. The engine examination did not reveal any evidence of a malfunction or failure.

There was no fuel in the carburetor bowl; however the engine remained inverted overnight prior to the examination. The air filter was clean and the spark plugs were normal in appearance. The smell of fuel was apparent in the area of the main wreckage and the ground was oil-soaked under the engine. The fuel shut-off valve was found in an intermediate position (not on or off) and there was no detent for the handle

A classic turn-back/stall/spin accident, not in a Jabiru airframe, with a Jabiru engine that was found to be running entirely according to spec. post-crash.

Most likely scenario, given that this was running on mogas, is either vapour lock with an ambient of 30C or fuel starvation due to incorrect fuel valve selection..

Additionally as a comparison the higher than normal fatal count in the Cirrus type aircraft in the US which has a far more exotic composite fuselage structure that does the Jab.

+ the fatal J230 near Mildura not long ago.

Rolf: two engine failures in training would make anybody wary - fair comment.

Glider pilots (mostly!) don't have an engine to worry about. I've had winch cable breaks at 400 feet, 600 feet; had to outland a number of times when the day died under me... once you're going down, you're going down and that's all there is to deal with. Gliders have enhanced landing capability over powered aircraft: with airbrakes and strong rudder control allowing huge amounts of steep sideslip, you can put them down in a very, very short run indeed. On the flip-side - they have bugger-all occupant safety characteristics, you're at the pointy end of an arrow. You learn to deal with the potential of a 'forced' landing from very early in your training.

I believe that anybody who assumes that the noise-source will continue to provide adequate propulsion in all situations - other than perhaps quad-engined heavies - is hopeful. Therefore, an intelligent risk-analysis will factor in the possibility of engine failure vs the potential of a 'safe' outcome if it happens. Statistics say that in a Jab, you are more likely to have an engine failure than in a Rotax-powered aircraft, but you are more likely to end up in one relatively undamaged piece if that happens.

In terms of survivability: in a Jab., you have (statistically) a damn good chance of walking away with little more than bruises from any engine-out event. An engine-out event may be less likely for other engines - but if one happens to you, that may be scant comfort.

No, it DOES matter, if you take risk into consideration. Look at the 'fatals' rate for RV6's or Lancair 320/340/360, or Cirrus, for that matter. In 25 years of operation in Australia, Jabiru's have precisely ZERO fatals other than the two in one that had a CFIT, and very few really serious injuries. Engines - any engines- can stop in mid-air. Your chance of survival - and in decent shape - is statistically better from a mid-air engine failure in a Jabiru than in just about anything else -and they have (regrettably, I agree) the numbers to make that claim statistically reliable.

If you are prepared to trade-off the reduced possibility of the engine stopping for safety in the event it does stop - then you won't buy a Jabiru. I have seen the results of a forced landing of a Rotax-powered aircraft from engine failure that by design traded off secondary safety for performance - the Goulburn Sting crash - and I will never, ever, leave the ground in one of them. I examined the crash site, and I am prepared to state that a Jab., or Cessna/Piper/Beechcraft/ Mooney et al would have withstood the crash with injuries but almost certainly not fatal. You would be safer being dropped from fifty feet in a crate full of broken glass bottles than in a Sting.

Rolf: have a look at: http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fflightdesign.com%2Ffiles%2FMedia%2FThe%2520Aviation%2520Consumer%2520-%2520LSA%2520Accidents.pdf&ei=Sw2NVJrSK4XRmwWF-oH4CQ&usg=AFQjCNGbNVJyj_byvBwqwrQ1HVpBgsPnHw&sig2=-Z0p_lSuu0IVwWN_lENYZA&bvm=bv.81828268,d.dGY

I thought it was Mobil but it really doesn't matter. The quality control process broke down and the Avgas ended up with Caustic in it, causing horrible corrosion to fuel system components of avgas powered aircraft. Many could not be economically repaired.Selling the same fuel across brand names has been happening for years. The basic product meets a standard (we hope) but anyone can add things to it and the motivation to do it is to avoid excise charges. applied to solvents used in road transport fuels.Maybe some particular company additives were added to the base fuel. Some were supposed to be "final filtered" and some had Tigers in the tank. We used to refine most of our fuel used here back then but the % refined continues to dwindle. We hold about only 3 weeks of fuel in reserve here, about the lowest % of any comparable society. Clever country????. I'd hate to live in dopey one IF we are clever. Nev

The BP Avgas contamination of quite a few years back now cost GA millions of $$ to rectify.

A very good friend of mine used to be the production manager at the Shell Clyde refinery; gave me the skinny on the industry. It's a long, involved and dirty story; suffice it to say, that the company logos on the bowsers have absolutely NO 1:1 relationship to the liquid that comes out of the nozzle. Next door to the Shell Clyde refinery, was the Caltex main depot for Sydney; there was a damn pipeline from the Shell tanks under the fence to the Caltex tanks. Shell tankers left the Shell refinery full of Shell refined petrol; Caltex tankers left the Caltex depot full of Shell refined petrol. The only difference was the paint on the trucks.

Mogas is hugely variable in quality at the bowser. With full engine monitoring and alert engine management plus intelligent fuel purchase and use / storage strategies, it can be a good source of energy for propulsive purposes; however if it is used without good knowledge of the 'issues' that can arise, it can be the mechanical equivalent of taking medication from unlabelled bottles on the basis of the colour of the pills inside.

Sheeeeeeeeeeeesh you blokes, 

 

And with a number of saleplanes above & below at the time.

Research on installation packages for CAMit engines is currently underway; this will deliver a set of cooling performance parameters that can be audited on individual installations. Lycoming requires such a process, as does Rotax, if an owner /manufacturer wishes to be covered by a 'full warranty'.

Now, now, settle down, it was just a horrible, scary bad dream. Always remember, a double negative becomes a positive, and that's not really going to happen, is it? Do TRY to be rational.

And therein lies the problem. If I came and looked at it, I'd see the outside of the engine, a few hoses, listen to your story, and be in no position to give anyone any advice on how good it was in terms of a repeatable life cycle for them.

Oh, and which hoses? the inlet tract SCAT tubes, the oil cooler hoses, or the fuel delivery hose? None of which are CAMit products nor a part of the engine.

The longer this mess is in the public arena the more damage is done to the brand. The simplest solution is a merger of CAMit and Jabiru. Both have much to gain- and everything to lose. Common sense maybe, but personalities are involved.

So the practical effect will be, I think, that CAMit will not take the modified Jabiru engine past experimental stage; but will instead go the whole nine yards and produce a "drop-in" engine in which everything is modified, so there can be no IP or liability squabbles. It will be a second-generation engine, incorporating all that Ian Bent has learned from manufacturing 4000 odd Jabiru engines, plus his own research.

So now it comes down to $$$. This may require a joint venture with an aircraft manufacturer, who may - I'm speculating, here - require exclusive rights to the engine.

Those people, and for that matter, this site, could have been effective in producing a genuine resolution to the problems. For the sake of playing the 'look at me' card, they have been a major part of the problem rather than the solution to the benefit of not just Jabiru owners and operators, but Recreational Aviation in this country. I expect this comment to be removed, due to the avowed position of the site owner and his stated editorial policies, but that does not invalidate the statement - it will just reinforce the effectiveness of selective censorship to the flow of information.

If you don't like the policies of this site feel free to leave anytime. Actually, you may not have a choice shortly. - Mod xox

Yes: money (and some time), but that's a simplistic answer to what is in fact a far more complex set of issues.

Very crudely and briefly: there are two paths. Certifying (not certification) to ASTM, requiring probably 200 hours of test running, cost likely to be round $350,000 at a minimum. Certification to JAR 22H; less test running required (only 50 hours) but there is a thicket of regulatory and legal (I.P rights, for one) hurdles to be overcome that, as things stand, make that a high-risk gamble. That level of risk could be reduced by cooperation between all parties involved (CAMit, Jabiru and CASA - and two of those parties - you can guess which ones - are not currently disposed to cooperate; that is a matter of record if you understand which 'records' you need to read).

jj - I think you mean, CASA's pushing could have the same thing happen again!.

They'd not be pushing to HAVE it happen again - if they had the expertise to actually know what is needed, which they have no demonstrable record of having. Gather any two CAR35/Part 21M engineers in a room and you'll probably get way too many examples of how much CASA does NOT have suitable depth of expertise. There was a meeting between CASA and a group of CAR35s a few years ago, and a quick run around the table of the 'this is me and here's my background' showed that there was MORE ex-CASA (or CASA's predecessors) experience on the CAR 35 representation than CASA itself had - and those CAR 35s had been out in the industry for many, many years..

Just on the through bolts issue on its own, there are at least four fairly well understood ( and almost always interlinked) causes: detonation, the case joining methodology, barrel base flange bending and the ratio of bolt pre-tension used to bolt ultimate fail strength. Inadequate radius on the base of the nuts is an 'assembly' issue. There is another factor, but that is very much something that has been established by proprietary research and as such, C-I-C. And, incidentally, the case material and method of manufacturing is absolutely NOT a contributing factor, that assertion is a piece of complete nonsense.

So, just on the through bolts issue alone, there is a 'systemic' response needed. To develop such a response it takes research to understand all the factors, design, manufacture and testing. All of the first three has already been done by CAMit and in-flight durability testing of that work is well advanced now, while formal certification / certifying testing was about to start when issues arose between CAMit and Jabiru that put it on hold.

CASA's current action has probably about a 95% chance (to be generous) of demanding a 'response' from Jabiru in a time-frame that will almost inevitably predicate a less than systemic approach. Everybody loses, yet again.

To remove Loctite'd flange bolts, the recommended technique is softening the Loctite with a heat gun to remove them and cleaning out the thread with a (bottoming) tap followed by a blast of air. Re-attach the flange with NEW bolts, torqued up in one hit.

The flange/shaft mating surface MUST be cleaned scrupulously before the flange is replaced: any paint etc. removed and use Loctite 7471 primer to clean the bolt holes, the bolts, the flange and the shaft before assembly.

What, specifically, were the 'risks highlighted by CASA'? Those documented BY CASA.

DDSAA - which happens to be the numerically (membership) largest club in Australia, I believe - have three Jabs. ( 2 x 160s and a 230) and a Drifter. It is particularly active in encouraging new and young membership, with flight training scholarships. Caboolture has at least one Jab., (J120) from memory.

For CAMit to be able to help out, it firstly has to stay in business. Since its business is (almost entirely) making engines for Jabiru to Jabiru's specification, this proposed CASA action would probably hit CAMit even harder than it hits Jabiru - leaving Jabiru owners and operators with aircraft of very, very little utility and leaving the only immediate, cost-effective and as things stand, researched and largely proven remedies unable to be provided to help them out.

Blithely talking about 'just throw in a Rotax' is fairly much a nonesense from a practical point of view. It would be instructive to those who assume this is a viable path, to seek information from those who have done it as to the cost AND the effect on the aircraft. The realistic figure seems to be around $40k, and a reduction in usable weight. And then, also find out the regulatory path required and ensure that the calculation of the (at today's figures) costs involved are contained in the estimate.

So, at least round $40k and months of downtime, while the necessary parts are made, (engine mount, cowlings, cooling set-up etc.), plus the requisite test flying and sign-off and then processing of the paperwork. To be applied to an aircraft that has had its market value seriously damaged and for which the resultant market value is at best entirely speculative until established. Only these who have the ready money to basically gamble could realistically be expected to go down that path.