Oscar

Maybe we care about safety, don't want anyone hurt, and don't want our flying restricted in the future.

You know, I'd be more convinced about your concern for 'safety' if I had a feeling that you extended that concern beyond Jabiru. I readily admit to a hyper-active Bullsh1t Detector Gland, so I invite you to remind me and the rest of us here about your expressions of concern for - let's just take a few outstanding examples just based of fatality rates - the crash-worthiness of RV6s, the aerodynamic and structural deficiencies of Gazelles, the horrendous fatality statistics of early Lancairs, the prominence in crash statistics of Cirrus aircraft, the failure rate of auto-engine conversions, the fatality rate in Trikes and autogyros.

 

Merv, on my reading of your posts over the last 12 months at least, you seem fixated on Jabiru (despite the fact that in terms of fatalities / injuries, Jabiru hardly appears on the concatenated rap sheets). Tell us it ain't so, Turbs, with evidence to back up your case.

 

 

This is all getting a bit conflated.

 

The 'truth', as far as it might be established by a serious and informed analysis of the various aspects, is - as it usually is - not exposed by reference to a few individual 'facts' (opr as increasingly appears to be the case here - quasi 'facts'), but needs intelligent analysis of the interaction of many apparently disparate threads into a cohesive whole ( and I do NOT apologise to Turbs if I'm using words he finds difficult to correlate with reality - that's his problem, not mine).

 

Let's pull out few actual facts by way of commentary on the posts just on this page of the thread alone.

 

kg, Jabiru were at their peak production actually ordering from CAMit 90 engines per month; on the basis of a requirement from Jabiru to be able to meet that volume of orders, CAMit moved to new premises and tooled-up to meet that demand. The CAMit facility was geared to meet that demand - at a very, very considerable amount of investment, multiple $M. Jabiru were not selling that volume of engines and their stockpile of engines grew. The extent of that stockpile may be gleaned from the current production rate: for some time now, 10 engines per month and none ordered for January 2015.

 

Trying to demonstrate a relationship between the figure of engines produced and engines actually going into service and accruing hours is in practical terms a nonsense, you cannot extrapolate an 'hours in service' figure from the total number of engines produced. Only an actual count of hours in service is a reliable measure - and that figure is simply not available. On the reported average aircraft hours per year of about 70 (being generous; the ATSB figures suggest it is about 60 hours per year and Jabiru and RAA agree that this is about right for 2014), it would be only on average, engines produced in or before 2000 that are capable of providing data for the 'reached 1000 hours' rate for problems.

 

We do not know the individual service history of Jab. engines. We don't know whether overhauls, zero-timed replacements etc. were carried out by prudent owners deciding that 'while it's in the L2's hands, I'll just get a full service/replacement etc. done'. The figure of 1000 hours TBO is not the same as the MTBF.

 

We also do not know what remedial actions may have been taken for Rotax engines when they were required to be checked for cracked crankcases, suspect crankshafts etc.. Who has the figures for owners /operators deciding that 'let's just do a full service while it's grounded anyway?' vs owners/operators saying 'well, if it looks ok, just button it up and I'll keep on flying'. Reliable data on that might provide a better basis for comparing statistics on failure rates than just the crude figures that CASA has apparently used for its decision to impose limitations.

 

One thing that we have seen from the publicly-available submissions to CASA, is that some FTS have a lamentable incidence of failures of Jabiru engines while others, who can, I believe, be assumed to operate under similar conditions, have very good service histories. This is in no way proof positive, but does give some credence to Jabiru's claims that 'operation and maintenance' is a major factor in engine reliability.

 

ATSB figures for accidents 2004-2013 state that 38 persons in Australia died from 'recreational aviation' accidents. Of those, I believe ONE was possibly - but is not yet conclusively proven - to be a result of a Jabiru engine failing. NO Jabiru-engine failure has, I believe, caused a fatality/serious injury to any passenger / student pilot. If anybody has contrary evidence, please bring it forward.

 

As far as I am aware - and I invite better information - NO 'person on the ground' - i.e. a 'non/participant' in the actual flight - has ever been even injured by ANY recreational aircraft. I conclude from that, that the CASA 'excuse' for the limitations on Jabiru engined-aircraft operational area access, is a complete fabrication that is unsupported by any statistical evidence.

 

The argument of 'potential' is entirely hypothetical; on recent statistics, you have more 'potential' to be killed as a result of someone's drunken one punch attack than of dieing in a Jabiru-powered aircraft. Or, as a result of a wayward Police car chase or a deranged nutter claiming to be an Islamic warrior, from eating too much McDonalds crap. Or rock fishing, going to sea in a tinnie, riding a bicycle in traffic, smoking, drinking, or even swimming when sharks are around.

 

 

Rhys, having been somewhat involved (in a small way) with assisting a Board member to get hold of information with which to formulate responses etc. to the Jabiru issue, let me say that the amount of time and effort that the members of the Board on the front-line put into trying to get some sense out of that whole debacle was simply monumental; communications were going on in the wee small hours of the morning at the end before CASA dropped the boom.

 

The implications of the CASA action are immense for RAA, and in terms of the allocation of energy to obvious priorities, I sincerely believe you should be relieved that the Board has been fighting diligently on its members behalf (and I am not currently a member, so I have no skin in the game here.)

 

At a more general level, I would suggest to you that the old adage 'do it once and do it right' needs to be a guiding principle for the changes that are - most definitely - needed to RAA administration and management. It seems to me that the current Board and the key administrative officers are almost exponentially more capable, enthusiastic and committed to pursuing that path than has been the case for many years. Expressing legitimate concerns about areas that need attention is useful input to the Board, but I don't believe that it is useful to obsess on details when a 'whole-of-enterprise' overhaul is needed.

 

 

I was thinking that only his mother would love him;)...

Merv - don't get bitter that I had a recognised mother... you can't be held responsible because yours ran away from you before you were born, it happens.

 

 

If an individual states that he doesn't find a specific number of engines achieving a specific TBO is not reassuring - that's a statement of personal opinion. It is not - and any intellectually competent person would recognise this - proof of failure before the specified TBO.

 

In philosophy, it is recognised that there is a logical disconnect between the statement 'All elephants are grey - this is grey - therefore, this is an elephant'. The same logical disconnect applies to Ornis's statement if it is construed to be a proof that Jabiru engines routinely do not reach 1000 hours TBO.

 

That said: there is certainly reasonable evidence to suggest that there are a significant number of Jabiru engines that do NOT reach 1000 hours TBO. What is missing from the debate is a forensic examination of the incidences of low-time problems and the circumstances relevant to those problems. We have seen evidence of FTF's with repeated low-time Jabiru engine problems and also evidence of FTF's with a history of thousands of hours of perfectly satisfactory operation of Jabiru engines. The application of reason over bias says that impartial investigation of the circumstances pertaining to the wide variance should be undertaken.

 

I personally believe that the CAMit modifications to the basic Jabiru engine represent significant improvements that should be recognised - and I've put my money on them over a standard Jab. engine. However, that does not mean that the 'risk' factor that CASA has implied - but not conclusively nor ( most tellingly) publicly demonstrated - is equitable to the imposition of the limitations.

 

 

Lighten up Oscar. dont take yourself so seriously.. Nobody else does :))

Jeez, Merv, and here was me thinking we had no common characteristics! Blimey, I had a few 'Gong lady friends in the late 60's and 70's ( not that I can remember much about them, but that was then..) - let's both hope there's no 'Days of Our Lives' revelations for you... or me...

 

 

Flogging the merits of Rotax 912's is irrelevant to the consideration of the failure rate of Jabiru engines. It may be in the commercial interests of those associated with Rotax engines but provides precisely zero additional information to the consideration of the situation that Jabiru engine owners have been placed.

 

 

Andy, I believe you have made many good points. The obvious opportunity for graft and corruption inherent in a free Polo shirt and a trip to the nasty video distribution capital area of Australia is one best not mentioned..

 

Surely, any proposals for change to the RAA Constitution need to be put to an 'objectives' test: What is the current state and what is the desired state? Just having a gut feeling that a change is needed isn't sufficient unless change for change's sake is the objective. There needs to be, for instance, some rationale beyond the 'X' seems too many, 'Y' sounds about right' argument for reducing the size of the Board.

 

I have worked for several organisations where there was a 'Board' (or equivalent, often called in this case the 'Council') with membership exceeding 10, that worked well - because it was recognised that Board members with specific areas of expertise should have the primary input to decisions about that area of operation. Board members were assigned 'Committee' status to consider the issues for that matter. So, e.g., the Finance Committee of the Board would consider 'finance' matters and report back to the Board for endorsement of their proposals, but not every Board member was expected to contribute other than a review function to those decisions. It needs to be noted that new Board members were selected (if untainted by political influence) on the necessity to ensure adequate membership of the defined 'Commitees' when an existing Board member retired. It didn't always work but more often than not it did, provided political interference didn't raise its ugly head.

 

The next test, I believe, needs to be the 'possibility of unintended consequences' test. The consequences of the current situation - whatever they may be - are usually well understood, but all too often, in a rush to change there is no risk analysis of the proposed new state. At the very least, people need to consider that any change mitigates risk of either new - or worse, a continuation of old - problems can result from a change. For examples of what I mean on a seriously global scale, look at the Treaty of Versailles and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

 

A third test should be 'would this change benefit RAA?' RAA exists fundamentally to administer recreational aviation for the benefit of those who wish to participate in recreational aviation. The various exemptions to the CASR allowed for recreational aviation is RAA's raison d'etre for its existence: NOT the formation of a 'club' for the convivial conglomeration of people who fly little aircraft nor yet the creation of a platform for a few to exercise some nebulous authority over others.. Leave the latter to the established major religious orders, FFS.

 

We have many established recreational aviation 'clubs' that provide members with all of the benefits of a cohesive group of members with the same objective: social interaction, shared facilities etc.. RAA is NOT, and should never be, a 'club' on steroids: it is a service provider to the recreational class of aviation and that needs to be its entire focus. To perform that function, it needs to be:

 

• efficient and effective in discharging its delegated responsibilities;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• a highly effective 'voice' for the recreational aviation society as a whole;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• a mechanism whereby the combined mass of recreational aviators can be bought to bear on 'authorities' or other entities (think insurance for a start) that have influence on the operation of recreational aviation;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• a source for technical, operational and safety administration and guidance for recreational aviators;
   
   
   
  
• a mechanism for reduction of the incidental costs of participating in recreational aviation ( e.g. by creating a pool of insurance premiums for public risk).
   
   
  

 

 

Beyond those objectives, I believe that RAA has no more than incremental value to members: such things as Natfly, the publication of Sport Pilot etc. are icing on the cake. The whole 'where is the RAA Office to be located' debate is little more than examining the warts on the elephant without consideration of the holistic situation of the elephant.

 

 

Very droll, Merv, but I'm not as juvenile as you.

 

 

Two points Oscar1) Once a few years back I (who am a nobody) wrote to minister at the time Phillip Ruddock and some weeks later received a detailed response. It was very defensive of his position but it was quite lengthy and specifically drafted, certainly not generic.

2) Having worked in parliament house Canberra I can assure you the female staff are young, smartly dressed and mostly smoking hot. The males are nerdy and some may well be spotty but not the chicks - the HR department has high standards.

A lady I lived with for a while, was one of those in category 2; specifically, the head of Information Services for the Senate. And yes, she was smoking; a certain leader of the Democrats tried repeatedly to hit on her. Gave up when he realised she was way more intelligent than him.

 

 

You raise an interesting point here.RAA have been collecting the statistics, why didn't RAA take care of business.

And before someone says "they don't have the power" again, I'd suggest if you look at the Constitution it has never got very far off the standard Model Constitution, has never had sections developed for Compliance and Enforcement and other operational matters, but there is a clear path for those things to be taken care of.

It has NOTHING to do with the RAA Constitution. It has to do with the authority under the CASR. I would have expected you to understand that, given your self-appointed knowledge of all things regulatory.

 

 

Hey oscar ol chum, truss is for sure a "dill", but hey he's convinced how many constituents repeated occasions, he's their man. .......truth be known he'll continue, their man.So.....does it follow he's smarter than his constituents. ( now that's scary. ) for how many yrs has ol warren, mumbled his tenure within Canberra.........maaate, he's there till he decides to take up lawn bowls.

Don't get me wrong: Truss is a league ahead of his likely successor, Joyce, who couldn't reliably count his toes even if they ARE the same number as his fingers.... But Transport is an hereditary portfolio of the Country Party as a member of a Coalition Government, even if the head of the Country Party (whatever they are called at the time) can't spell 'Transport'. Mind you - Albanese was no damn better.

 

 

Yes, they are certainly to be ignored at your peril, no argument. But with regard to 'never assuming what you just said' - I have a long, long time of experience with 'what I just said' - that goes back to when Killen was Minister of Defence and Peter Nixon the self-appointed 'Bastard from the Bush') Minister for Transport. Personal friendships and social interaction as well as professional interaction - Canberra was like that in the 70's.

 

 

People, you need to understand that this is a standard response drafted by someone in the Minister's office, not even by CASA. Ministerial staff have appallingly high levels of power, given that they are there to protect the Minister's person - NOT to advance the 'business' of actual government. Their function is to ensure that the Minister remains 'the Minister' and remains politically appealing i.e. will be re-elected!

 

Having been a relatively senior public servant for many years, I've had years of dealing with Minister's offices. It is a standard requirement to reduce absolutely everything presented to a Minister to a specified length consistent with the Minister's attention span: about two A4 pages maximum of mostly dot points. Doesn't matter whether this was a response to a constituent's whinge about why their cat was not rescued from a tree in less than two hours after they rang 000 or a multi-million $$ proposal for a new programme for an improvement to survival rates for cancer: two pages was the response/submission requirement. With specific topic headings to be completed.

 

Camel, your Ministerial letter never reached Truss's attention, nor will your response. It was fielded by some spotty mid-20's apparatchik in the Minister's office and put on the slate for a response - which it has received. The generic response letter has in all likelihood been drafted by CASA and 'polished' by the Ministerial staff; meantime Truss is wandering aimlessly around Rockhampton on his summer vacation, blissfully unaware. Oh, and he's running the country at the moment - good thing we're all on Christmas break, eh?

 

Mind you, Truss is blissfully unaware of the world in general; he is intellectual porridge. He has been the Minister responsible for Aviation matters for many years - including during Howard's time - and he has consistently exhibited a grasp of aviation that can be summed up as: "If God had intended Man to fly, He would never have given us the Railways". He can probably count his toes, assuming he has the same number of them as his fingers, but you'd be wishful if you assumed anything more cerebral from him.

 

 

Trying for the world's longest euphemism Oscar?

I regard that as an intensely personal question, though I am aware that some of my past lady acquaintances have compared favourable impressions. However, I am quite, quite sure that there are Canetoads around who are far bigger euphemisms than me. It's not all about distance; consistency counts.

 

 

The existing (Acting) DAS 'clearing his desk?' As a euphemism, that's up there with 'the expanding Canetoad population in Australia is an unfortunate consequence of slight oversights in the research behind the promulgation of biological control mechanisms'. More like a 'scorched-earth action as the retreat continues'...

 

Mark Skidmore had been liaising with RAA over this issue; he had also publicly stated his intention of embracing the Forsyth Review recommendations - in line with Government stated policy on those. CASA moved in the face of serious questions (that remain unanswered) on the validity of the data they claimed supported their action and without any discussion of alternative courses of action proposed by RAA.

 

The phrase 'bloody-minded intransigence' seems appropriate. Since Skidmore was the selected candidate for the position of DAS over any continuation of Farqharson's seigneurship, one is tempted to also use the phrase 'vindictive bastardy'. Of course, you might say that but I could NEVER comment on it.

 

 

There has to be some kind of elected representatives, if only to select the board. However in my opinion you'd be better off just having a 7 person board elected by all the members.

Yep, that's the point I am trying to make: RAA needs a Board with the best level of expertise to discharge its functions, that it can get from who may offer to take up that burden. Geographical areas need someone who can kick down Council doors, whip up local support, energise people to fight for the rights of RAA members. While both skills are not necessarily mutually exclusive, it is rarely the case that both sides of the equation combine in an individual.

 

 

I have suggested before and I think it is still worth considering, the idea that there should be a 'two tier' structure.

 

The Board should comprise a mix of defined expertise relevant to its responsibilities - say: Financial, Administrative, Legal, Technical, Operational.

 

Then, below that, area 'representatives' who represent to the Board any specific area concerns (e.g. airfield closures, airspace restrictions etc.) and also are the first-line representatives of the RAA in dealings with local authorities, promotion of the activity and suchlike.

 

With the exception of compliance with the Incorporated Associations rules for the home authority, NOTHING that RAA administers has any regional variation whatsoever. There is precisely zero justification for demanding that the necessary expertise on the Board be drawn from geographically disparate areas. Regional representation is a good idea to ensure that RAA takes an informed and unified position in regard to any regional 'problems', and it would be good if regional representatives are persons with the contacts, the ability and the time to promote / defend RAA activities in their area.

 

Up-front and critical, is that the Board needs to provide RAA with the expertise to guide it to perform its primary responsibilities as efficiently and effectively as possible. Regional representation is a good mechanism to ensure that RAA activities in any given area have the best chance of being promoted / defended.

 

 

When you are a totalitarian regime and you make the rules, then bend them and break them it is all OK and above board because you don't answer to anyone who has any interest in fair play or reasonableness. You do it in the name of the 3rd letter in your acronym with no definitions or limits.

And in fact, exactly that is done by CASA in contraveyance of its own regulations - and not just in this case. The phrase 'applying the regulation by what CASA wants it to say, not what it actually says' has been used correctly on quite a number of occasions - the extension of the limitation on Jabiru engines to experimental class aircraft being a glaring example.

 

 

It has just occurred to me that there is an identified risk in driving a motor car, apparently hundreds are killed each year in Australia, the government must act now and stop these vehicles being used around the public and get all who wish to travel within to sign a waiver.

The analogous action would be for cars with ANCAP ratings of, let's say, less than 4 to be similarly limited.

 

 

I'm referring to the way ornis presented it, not the original document, with which I have no argument.The document makes statements that I accept are factual. I also agree that no inference of adverse failure rates SHOULD be implied from it. It is pretty much background information, giving some idea of the activity of the make.

Just in passing, . There are significant differences in the early 1600 cc engines. They appear to not be included. I'm not suggesting they should be either.Nev

Nev, my aircraft is prod No. 50 and was used as a factory hack for the development and certification of the 2200 engine - though technically it was an ST1 with a 1600 engine as sold. The 1600 should not be included in any data concerning Jab. engines, I doubt there are any left actually in service - I have the wings off the last one that I believe was in service..

 

 

Ornis, if you don't know what was said how can you possibly know what wasn't said?

Spoiling a good yarn by introducing logic ? Obviously, you will never learn. So sad.

 

Those who know Ian Bent will recognise that he doesn't engage in 'loose talk' for the sake of promotion of his products. If someone presented to him a set of numbers for the performance of their existing Jab. engine that he considers shows it to be always operating within limits, he would - in my experience - be prepared to say that it has, on balance, a fair chance of continuing to operate reasonably. That's recognition of the facts.

 

However, it is NOT in any way a blanket statement regarding Jab. engines. The various submissions to CASA indicate clearly that some operators have a history of repeated early engine problems while others have a history of exactly the opposite. Blind Freddy can see that some operators have developed practices, be they maintenance / operation, that enhance the operational use of Jab engines, while others punish their engines. The argument that 'we were operating to Jabiru's specifications' is a separate issue and while it MAY be correct, has yet, I believe, to be backed up with reliable data. There just is not the forensic level of evidence available.

 

 

jj - was not intending to jerk your chain in any way, but to ensure that people are aware of the divergence between CAMit's 'responsibility' for Jabiru engines and where Jabiru has placed itself, and also the context ofCAMit's development programme for the CAE engine. Given the comments by some on this forum, they would have anybody associated with Jabiru tarred with the same brush and while the agendas there are obvious, it needs to be understood that the differences are real and significant.

 

 

Appears to be a step forward, let's see how big that step gets. ( encompassing type "C" aircraft could save a lot of folks )$14k changeover, no restrictions, I'm in.

If the CAE 2200 engine ( not the CAMit-modded Jabiru engines, still plated as such) is certificated to JAH 22H, I believe it would be an acceptable substitution by EO, which will add a bit to the cost because of the unnecessarily complicated way that CASA requires EOs for 'major components' to be handled. It appears that testing for certification / certifying of the 3300 engine to ASTM is about to get underway (following the hiatus introduced into this work originally planned for late last year), but as far as I am aware it has yet to be decided exactly what sequence of testing will be undertaken, due in part to the complications that have recently happened.

 

 

jj, you are not quite correct in saying that Ian Bent 'designed' the original Jab. 2200 ( the 1600 was all Rod Stiff's design, AFAIK) but he certainly did have input into translating Rod's ideas into manufacturable form, which was recognised by the original IP agreement between CAMit and Jabiru.

 

However, the following extract from a Yahoo 'Jab. engines' thread that appeared in the last few days was added by Ian and clarifies the CAMit position:

 

CAMit maintains an AS/NZS ISO 9001:2008 quality system #1776 2003; continuously audited by Telarc SAI Limited since 2003

 

� CAMit holds a CASA Production Certification authorisation #760529-1 which allows the manufacture of certified aviation products

 

� To quote a CASA auditor,” CAMit is seen as able and willing”

 

� CAMit has specifically not been allowed input into the design, or sourcing of components for Jabiru engines for 9 years

 

� No feedback is supplied by Jabiru to CAMit, of any issues that indicate a QA problem

 

� CAMit does not accept Jabiru supplied components into our quality system as we are not aware of their provenance. Jabiru are responsible for the compliance of these components

 

� On CASA’s advice, CAMit can only conform components sourced or manufactured by CAMit

 

� CAMit supplies contract measuring services for some Jabiru supplied components. Material qualification services are not (cannot be) supplied

 

� CAMit assembles and test runs Jabiru engines to Jabiru specifications. CAE engines are assembled and test run to CAE specifications. There are significant differences.

 

�

 

Further to this - and of direct relevance to this thread, is a copy of a response to a CAE engine owner's query to CASA seeking confirmation that CAE engines are not subject to the CASA restrictions:

 

To Whom It May Concern.

 

 

 

I can confirm that the CAMIT engine is not subject to the operational limitations described in 292/14, as this engine is not manufactured by a person under licence from, or under a contract with Jabiru.

 

 

 

Regards,

 

 

 

Mike Higgins

 

Manager

 

Continuing AirworthinessAirworthiness & Engineering Standards Branch

 

Standards Division

 

Civil Aviation Safety Authority