Jump to content

turboplanner

Members
  • Posts

    24,359
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    159

Posts posted by turboplanner

  1. Just received from Jabiru.Hello Jabiru Fleet,

     

    Welcome back to 2016 and our first update for the coming year.

     

    Sales are continuing to go well in our overseas markets. Jabiru North America currently have six J230’s on order. Two will depart at the end of this week, two in March and two more in May. We have a J170-D due off the production line within the next few weeks and it will be leaving us in March for its new Australian home. It is great to see these new Jab’s flying the coop.

     

    Our roller cam engines are receiving a very good press. Total hours are now exceeding 30,000. Several of these engines have been back for their top end overhaul at 1000 hours in good condition and returned to service. Close to 100 people have now been through the Engine Maintenance Workshop held here at Jabiru. This training program, along with the on-going engineering research and development here at Jabiru is greatly improving the overall professionalism of the fleet. We will all keep up the good work and blitz those Rotax’s J

     

    The CASA limitations are unfortunately still in place. Information we have received tells us that the on-going airworthiness department of CASA has no further issues with Jabiru. We are unsure of the reasons why the limitations are still in place. It would appear that the matter of lifting these restrictions may be held up by the legal department. We would of course like the limitations to be lifted as soon as possible. We continue to provide correspondence to CASA, Mr Warren Truss MP and our local members of parliament. The more correspondence they receive on the impact the limitations continue to have on owners and operators will assist. Correspondence can be sent to CASA, your local member, Mr Warren Truss MP at [email protected] and the Industry Complaints Commissioner CASA at [email protected]

     

    The team here at Jabiru looks forward to the coming year with positivity and as always we sign off with “Happy Landings”

     

    Inbox?number=475716727&part=1.3&filename=image003.jpg

     

    JABIRU AIRCRAFT PTY LTD

     

    PO Box 5792

     

    Bundaberg West Qld 4670

     

    Ph: 07 41551778

     

    Fax: 07 41552669

     

    Email: [email protected]

     

    www.jabiru.net.au

     

    www.facebook.com/JabiruAircraft

    We can start again then with this positive news, particularly about engines now being returned to service after 1,000 hours.

     

     

    • Like 1
    • Winner 1
  2. That is because I don't wish to start a firefight regarding other makes, simply to draw attention to the fact that there are valid reasons why the restrictions on Jabirus are inconsistent with the old dictum of 'start with the worst of the problem and work your way back from there', and I particularly don't want to make 'capital' of Ross Millard's sad demise.

    Well without even some basic statistics, you're drawing attention to squat.

    Ross's name has already got two inappropriate and despicable mentions since he died.

     

     

    • Agree 1
  3. Which one FT ? How much flying have you done in ANY of those 2 ? Personally, I have approx 2000 hrs in one of those types & AM still alive - at least when i just checked:oh yeah:

    That's about exactly the hours of the pilot who spun one in during a routine final turn in Sydney - that one shook me; if he could do it what chance would I have?

     

     

  4. It was pretty clear what Oscar was saying... he was implying Lightwing accident rate was far more unacceptable than Jabiru.

    I didn't see any suggested risk trend related to the aircraft itself in his words though, which might have made his words more persuasive.

     

     

  5. Your #185 Gandalph:

     

    (a) Yes it is a she (b) she is currently fully occupied with punishment duties.

     

    When someone says to you "Mr G, you became aware of this risk on April 4 and the deceased's crash occurred on April 8, what action had you taken to mitigate this very obvious risk?" and you say "none", things aren't likely to be good.

     

    I guess there is some "reasonable time" to act, but you can't predict the future.

     

    I'm not so sure about the Director thing; I've found that people who supervise 800 to 1,000 people generally don't have much of an idea about what goes on day to day in the various divisions, despite the extremely switched on appearance those people project, but you may have some inside information.

     

    Especially now they aren't waiting around for the disinterested Judge who at least looks at both sides.

     

     

  6. I also searched for Cessna 172 specifically, there were about 50 Engine failure or malfunction reports in the last 5 years.

    Interesting.

    Is it possible to further narrow this down to Engine failure/malfunction causing a forced landing? i.e. not fuel exhaustion, flooded carbs, spark plug fouls, electrical, pilot misuse, carb icing etc, just engine mechanical failure.

     

    Is it also possible to do the same for Piper PA 28 Cherokee 140 and Piper Cherokee Warrior (the 140 successor) - leave out the PA28-160 and PA28-180, they are more powerful touring aircraft.

     

    We would then have a loose comparison for three aircraft used in training and short to medium cross-country with total numbers of engine failures. If you made the five years 2007 to 2012, we would have the data for the same years as the RAA data on Jabiru.

     

     

    • Agree 3
  7. No, I assumed the role of investigator, who, I'd hope, would be a person with some reasonable level of technical skills and qualifications and certainly not at the junior level. I'd also expect that as an investigator I'd be a "disinterested" person in the same way that a Magistrate is supposed to be disinterested in the cases he/she hears. I would expect the Director of CASA would NOT conduct or even head such an investigation. I'd expect the Director to be fully and and competently briefed on the issue and I'd further expect that a range of options would be put to the Director. We don't know if the latter was done but there is widespread belief that the outgoing Director saw a golden opportunity to leave a warm steaming turd on the incoming Directors desk.

     

    The avoidance of any fatalities an very high goal. In most activities the aim is surely harm/risk minimisation which (should) pursue by rigorous risk assessment and management. If, as you claim CASA's role is the aim is to avoid any fatalities their inspectors should be in the field as we speak, removing the propellors from the entire RAA fleet.

     

    Re Tiger airways: I believe there was far more substantiated evidence for CASA's action in that case. I also believe that ANSETT came close to enjoying the same fate but escaped by the skin of their teeth. The justification for the Jabiru injunction is much more tenuous and hardly analogous to those events

    I apologise for being long winded getting back to you, but I got into terrible trouble for not putting the dinner on early enough and I'm just recovering.

     

    I didn't mean anything by the word "junior" other than that you kicked the decision upwards, and the answer I was looking for from your and Facthunter was what decision you would have made if you had been the decision maker.

     

    The "ground all aircraft" decision completely eliminates the risk, and varieties of this have been very successful in various industries. For example the falls from heights legislation makes it impractical for farmers to load small hay bales, and build haystacks, above 2 metres from ground level, and that has seen a wholesale move into bigger round and square bales, loaded and unloaded by tractors.

     

    The CASA action is not quite at that level, and does potentially leave CASA open to legal action by anyone injured or killed, so I guess you could say they are balancing one risk against another.

     

    Even in the discussion we've had you can see that these decisions are not easy to make if you don't want hordes of disaffected people around your neck. Consequently I don't think CASA decided they'd go out and make things as difficult as they could for as many people as they could.

     

    The other factor in this decision was time.

     

    At one of my meetings one of the State Associations made the meeting aware of a massive race car fire, in a class we'd been told was totally fireproof, and which had led to an exemption for the drivers from wearing firesuits.

     

    We now had a forseeable risk, and we had to make the decision on the spot before any further racing occurred. I asked for a motion that firesuits be made compulsory for all 1100 drivers in that class, and got a unanimous vote from all the bodies present.

     

    So while I'm generally supportive of your suggested process and Facthunter's thought process, sometimes you can't sit still.

     

    As a matter of interest, my cousin is a barrister in South Australia, and was telling me recently that they have a Court problem, because almost all the public liability cases are being settled out of Court. This situation requires a different strategy again if singing your behind is to be avoided.

     

     

  8. Without trying to appear "Cute", a reasonable foreseeable risk you cope with. An unacceptable foreseeable risk you have to modify/ change something before you continue.

    I was using the Donoghue v Stevenson based meaning - that if there are forced landings occurring there's a reasonable forseeable risk that someone is going to be hurt or killed.

     

     

  9. If you analyse data and find a trend or pattern in some accidents, you act to train or educate people to reduce/eliminate it. That is the reason you should report everything. So others can benefit from your experience. The way we teach stalls and recovery is totally ineffective. Blind Freddy can see that. We are negligent in not doing it better. Nev

    You're as brutal as me at times, but it is better to take sh!t from the living than to be scratching your head writing a eulogy.

     

    If a trend develops, the first step is for the Controlling Body to address the risk, at which time the controlling body has the freedom to decide what action to take, and subsequently measure the success.

     

    If the CB can't or won't address it then the Regulator has to step in and then you lose control.

     

     

  10. So - you would, it seems, more or less agree with my statements for months now that around 16-18 'in-flight failures' is a reasonable deduction?

    I've already posted my own findings of an average 6.8 from 2007 to 2012, I've already said I don't have a problem with Jabiru's claimed 12 in 2014.

    I've said I don't believe the final numbers matter; the key is to eliminate a "reasonable forseeable risk".

     

     

  11. And also all the C172's in Australia.

    On what basis? Have you looked at the ATSB statistics for forced landings caused by engine failures over the past few years?

    Or for Cherokee 140 and Cherokee Warrior?

     

    That might put things in perspective.

     

     

  12. Since Jabiru have NO recorded fatalities from forced landings, the statement that 'the next forced landing could have been a fatal' - while absolutely correct in logic - is extremely contradicted by statistics from 25 years of operation. That is one of the most fatuous comments regarding genuine aviation safety I have ever witnessed.

    I'd prefer fatuous to flatulence Oscar.

    There was nothing in my statement pointing to the airframe being a key reason for a potential fatality.

     

    However, there have over the years been many unsuccessful forced landings, and in particular, within RA in Australia we had a series around 2010 - 2012 with stalls/spins in from heights,some above 1000 feet, where no fuselage structure would have saved the pilot, so no implications on Jabiru or the fuselage whatsoever.

     

     

  13. We've had two or three quite big threads on supporting ultralights, and they go on for some time with people saying what should be done but when the comments start to run dry and it's time for people to say what they are going to do, the thread peters out.

     

    We didn't establish on the last thread there is no impediment to the ultralight section, and there are affordable models available.

     

    It seems to hinge on whether anyone wants to go out and fly one.

     

     

  14. "Grounding the Fleet" would have been the furthest thing from my mind. It's an extreme act for an extreme situation. The Tiger matter was quite contentious I recall . I wouldn't use those things as a good example. It shows they have the power to do it. Often not much else. Nev

    Well you still haven't committed yourself, and there was an urgency at the time - the next forced landing could have been a fatal.

     

     

  15. In looking at the supposed 46 failures and who reported them, these are interesting;

     

    Spark plugs, reported by RAAus

     

    Avgas, reported by RAAus

     

    Temperatures, reported by RAAus

     

    Alternator wiring, reported by RAAus

     

    Nose Wheel, reported by RAAus

     

    Tyre deflated, reported by RAAus

     

    Caliper part, reported by RAAus

     

    Proximity Issue, reported by RAAus

     

    Brake calipers, reported by RAAus

     

    Nosewheel collapse, reported by RAAus

     

    Maintenance process, reported by RAAus/Jabiru

     

    Radio problem, reported by RAAus

     

    Distributor rotor loose, reported by RAAus

     

    EFATO no reason, reported by RAAus

     

    Alternator failure, reported by RAAus

     

    Delaminated prop, reported by RAAus

     

    Cigarette socket short, reported by RAAus

     

    Carburettor flooding, reported by RAAus/Jabiru

     

    Flap circuit breaker, reported by RAAus

     

    Brake pad jammed, reported by RAAus

     

    Show cause why pilot should not be suspended for two months, reported by RAAus

     

    Aircraft control system (Morgan), reported by RAAus

     

    Electrical, reported by RAAus

     

    Inexperienced pilot/high engine idle, reported by RAAus

     

    Bowden cable, reported by RAAus

     

    Leaking fuel pump, reported by RAAus

     

    Undercarriage issue, reported by RAAus

     

    Undercarriage issue, reported by RAAus

     

    Rudder cables, reported by RAAus

     

    Radio Issue, reported by RAAus

     

    Prop blades, reported by RAAus

     

    Loose control fittings, reported by RAAus

     

     

  16. You directed the question to Nev but I'll have a go at answering it.I would have asked my sister organisation, the Australian Transportation SAFETY Bureau, if they had any data relevant to the information provided to CASA by the RAA that I should consider and that might expand my understanding of the issue.

     

    I would have gone back to the RAA and asked for complete details of the incidents listed in their spreadsheet.

     

    As a caveat, we don't know whether the RAA simply provided a bare bones summary of accidents/incidents relating to Jabiru powered craft or whether they supplied, as supplementary data, copies of member's incident reports and copies of RAA's investigations into those reports. I rather suspect that given the impossibly tight timeframe allowed by CASA for the RAA to provide information to CASA that the RAA Board and staff did their best and slammed together a spreadsheet expecting (wrongly) that CASA would exercise due diligence and cross check the RAA with their records and cull the flat tyre; fuel starvation; carb icing; comms failures ets from the data to be considered. I think that the RAA believed that the spreadsheet they provided was PRELIMINARY information and that they would be allowed sufficient time to refine and elaborate on the first flush information provided.

     

     

    That additional information from ATSB and RAA might have allowed me to form an opinion as to whether there WAS a problem with Jabiru engines.

     

    If I was to form an opinion that there was a problem with the mechanical integrity of Jabiru engines then I might draft a carefully worded detailing the results of my investigation and justifying any action I might propose for the (then) rabidly anti-RAA Director to include in any direction to the fleet to alleviate the problem(s) identified by my thorough and rigorous investigation.

     

    I would not have sat back and said: "WOW! 40 failures per year! I'd better tell Mr F he can ground the fleet and drop the incoming Director in it with one fell swoop."

    Don't have any problem with any of that, but you've assumed the position of a junior, and kicked the problem upstairs. What I was getting at was, if you were the Director, and you'd done all that (or had others do it), what sanction would you have imposed.

     

    It's not such an easy decision if the aim is to avoid any fatalities.

     

    I was asked at the time what I would have done, and I said "ground the fleet" on the basis that this would have eliminated any fatality, but this wasn't very popular if I recall. CASA did it to Tiger Airlines though.

     

     

    • Caution 1
  17. Well the "thinking of RAAus" can only be that if the members continue to allow the people elected as board members to go off and make their own decisions, do their own thing as if they were company directors.

     

    You own the Association, and need to take control of it.

     

    If you go through the RAA accident/incident reports, you'll see plenty of very obvious mistakes, which a volunteer oversight group would normally pick up.

     

    Same goes with pilot behaviour; Volunteer Stewards can see a problem developing on the local field.

     

     

  18. If the numbers of engine failures is reduced, which you almost seem to be accepting now........ then Jabiru possibly fall alongside other engines in terms of reliability.

    I collated the 5 year RAA figures a couple of years ago, and the total was Jabiru 34, Rotax 3, and I've posted the results several times since then.

    RAA hasn't changed those figures.

     

    The question asked a year ago, How will/has the action altered the safety of all the Jabiru engined aircraft?

    There were no prescriptive mechanical directions in the action, so it didn't alter the engine performance itself, other than where people became much more careful with service, and tinkered less.

    The action did ensure less people in the aircraft and less aircraft over built up areas.

     

     

  19. I think that the forum thread structure does not allow derailling of all forumite's aviation thoughts. After all one must decide to select an 'off topic' thread before being exposed to its heretical content.

    Therein lies the problem; there are one or two so obsessed with having just the information they want, that they will moan and groan until they get it, rather than simply leave their finger off the mouse.

     

     

  20. EXACTLY! that's all they appeared to do. They do not appear to have queried, verified or otherwise examined the data reportted with anything like a questioning mind. The took the lazy way out.

    That's what people have been speculating, but they don't know, CASA hasn't told them, they don't know what CASA knows.

    The CASA mindset appears to be:

    1. An that engine stops (for any reason) = an engine that has failed

     

    2 A forced landing for any reason = an engine failure..

    With your background, you would know that just when the bombshell of the 46 failures was about to drop, CASA can simply say "There are a number of errors in this document, obviously fuel exhaustion or a flat tyre is not an engine failure, so the numbers supplied by xxxx are reduced to X', and the process goes on with the correct numbers.

     

    I did NOT say that there were ATSB reports included in the CASA spreadsheet I DID suggest that a search of the ATSB database would provide reports on incidents that appeared, ( ie: could be cross referenced to incidents) in the CASA spreadsheet and that the causes noted in the ATSB reports did NOT tally with the CASA reported causes.

    I can't explain the difference; perhaps the Jabiru/RAA summaries were on the spreadsheet, as you would expect, and the ATSB summaries differed from the Jabirui/RAA, or perhaps they were the blanks. The aircraft registrations are listed for each entry, so it should be possible to reconcile. I would be concerned if CASA have changed any of the wording on the reports from Jabiru/RAA.

     

    Not at all; I knew it was going to be read by one of the best nitpickers in the business.

  21. I think it goes beyond being a pilot too. It'd be a great way of enticing students to all areas of aviation from engineering to mechanics to design to ground crew etc.And let's face it. Although flying can be expensive, an hour's lesson costs less than getting blind drunk on a weekend!

    Well that's one comparison....

     

    Another is the cost of cigarettes. During a recent trip a small package of cigarettes was delivered to a Roadhouse owner while I was there; you could hold it in one hand. He ruefully looked at it and told me he had to pay $3,000.00 for it - about $6000.00 at retail - a staggering amount for such a small parcel.

     

     

×
×
  • Create New...