Garfly

Geez, being but half-on-board the Diesel train ain't never enough.

Clearly, the 'legal authority' of ERSA covers operational and safety matters only. It doesn't extend to 'Consumer Law' or any 'user pays' arrangements between airports and aviators.

For me, the suicide theory has never rung true regarding the AI 171 crash. But whether you're inclined for or against that explanation, there are several sophisticated arguments out there - on both sides - which do not rely on the timeline and selective CVR quotations set out in the AAIB's Preliminary Report which has been widely regarded as partial and unreliable from the get-go. This recent BBC article is a pretty level headed review of the various theories as they currently stand: The furious dispute over what caused Air India flight 171 to crash WWW.BBC.COM The final conclusions of the investigation have yet to be published, although more could become apparent in the coming days.

Yes, I'm amazed how he manages all that while keeping the production values of the videos so high.

That's not a vid, that's a 'composite image' to illustrate the article. CLICK FOR FULL REZ. Regulatory changes clear CTA path for RAAus - Australian Flying WWW.AUSTRALIANFLYING.COM.AU Last month, CASA amended the Civil Aviation Orders to permit Recreational Pilot Certificate (RPC) holders to access controlled airspace.

'Slinging Down Under' runs a great local YouTube channel. This video, only just posted, is the second instalment of his planned series about the Big Lap (ex Albury) he's currently doing with his wife and daughter in the aircraft he built himself. I reckon he does a terrific job of the flying and the filmmaking. He has heaps more vids on his YT site: https://www.youtube.com/@OzSlingTSI

Are you referring to D353 SFC/1500 VFR lane, LTF? I guess that'd always be available but wouldn't help Brendan and his mob stuck under an activated R360 at YWSL. I suppose D353 works like D589 which tunnels its way through Williamtown's military airspace. CLICK FOR FULL REZ:

In-flight engine shutdown and forced landing involving Cessna 441, VH-LBZ, 3.6 km from Broome Airport, Western Australia, on 19 March 2026 | ATSB WWW.ATSB.GOV.AU And according to the Google bigbot, this ain't the first time such a thing has happened (poor ergonomics strikes again): AI Overview The primary problem with the Cessna 441’s engine Stop and Start buttons is their vulnerable ergonomic layout in the cockpit. Because these buttons are closely grouped together and lack sufficient physical barriers, pilots have inadvertently triggered engine shutdowns during critical phases of flight.

Agreed... the charging regime should be (and at many places is) scaled differently for residents and students and, I reckon, anyone doing circuits for currency. None of that should be discouraged by ridiculous fees imposed by councils who haven't got a clue.

After Hamilton Island?? ;- )

A bit more info on the Ballina arrangements from: Aviation Safety Advisor Industry and Government Engagement CASA\Stakeholder Engagement Division "TWR hours are published in the available new ERSA, (effective 9 July) on the Airservices Australia website (Resources tab, Aeronautical Information Package (AIP), but also keep your eyes out on the AIP SUPPS / AIC’s and NOTAMS for any amendments / further information. There will be a physical control tower mounted on a structure, staffed 7 days/week located just in front of the ARFFs station, (runway side of the ARFFs), painted with red and white stripes, like a KFC bucket!"

That's not at all what I was on about. But let it pass.

Well you're finally getting the little debate you wanted. But some of us have other fish to fry.

Personally, if the amount at stake is in the order of ten bucks I'd save my rage for more important things. [Such as private fee collection outfits hijacking tracking info designed for safety to 'discover' the whereabouts of aeroplanes for profit. It'd be outrageous enough even if they took pains to always get it right.]

It'd be nice to see a final update from CASA in the same friendly tone - and level of detail - as this consultation from last year. Ballina controlled airspace - preferred design - Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Citizen Space CONSULTATION.CASA.GOV.AU Find and participate in consultations run by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Anyway, I guess all will be revealed in a week or two.

I did get a response from ASA/CASA which seems to confirm that the CTA endo for RAAus is not far off. EMAIL I SENT TO ASA: (sent on to CASA for a reply) Dear Airservices, I’ve spent lots of time digging my way through an avalanche of (beautifully produced) online information regarding the imminent Ballina changes but can’t seem to find an answer to the question that must be on many stakeholders' lips: what, if any, arrangements have been put in place for VFR pilots (esp. without a CTA endo) to use, or even transit, YBNA and environs in the future (particularly during the vast majority of CAVOK daylight hours when nary an RPT is within cooee)? From the information that is out there, it seems the designers have been sensitive to the issue and keen on coming up with safe and practical work-arounds. So I’m a bit curious why this elephant-in-the-room still seems somewhat under wraps. Or maybe I just haven’t clicked hard enough or far enough. ;- ) RESPONSE FROM CASA MAY 28: "Thanks for sending your query through. When Ballina control zone and associated class D airspace is active, pilots will require controlled airspace endorsements to enter these areas. This also includes entry into the overlaying class C airspace. Check ERSA, AIP SUPPS and NOTAMS for Ballina procedures including TWR hours of operation, and the current charts for the airspace boundaries. Currently RaAus have revised manuals in with CASA being assessed to provide training for Controlled Airspace endorsements in the future to their members. Once the manuals have been approved RaAus will communicate the process to gain this endorsement. If you are wishing to gain the controlled airspace endorsement, I encourage you to consult our VFRG and the AIP, especially aircraft equipment requirements, weather minimums and radio procedures in controlled airspace, prior to commencing a controlled airspace endorsement course. CASA do have a range of general resources, podcasts and webinars which you may find helpful in in the CASA Pilot Safety Hub part of the website." Aviation Safety Advisor Industry and Government Engagement CASA\Stakeholder Engagement Division

Some interesting observations from these two (the short version: 18:00 > 32:00) Also this YT comment: @DEJLinguist 4 hours ago (edited) With AF447 I seem to remember that one factor was they were so used to the stall protections of normal law that they felt 'safe' pulling back with abandon and it wasn't sufficiently clear to them that in alternate law the responsibility for avoiding a stall was fully on them. Another factor that probably wouldn't have been encountered in a Boeing. I also seem to recall I think a test flight accident where a factor in the crash was that the non normal law they found themselves in meant they had to manually trim which they were not used to something a Boeing pilot does all the time instinctively. Airbus should have neon signs flash up saying 'you are now responsible for this flight critical task when the law level drops.

Juan has his own take on the incident. He reckons it shows once again the limits of 'see and avoid' and that the FAA should approve the SkyEcho2 for use in the USA by tiny craft. They're currently allowed only in the UK, NZ and OZ, he says. (But then, aviators would have to be prepared to sneak occasional glances at their multifunction avionics for the SE2 to help 'em 'see' ;- )

It doesn't have to to be one thing or the other. I think it's all of the above. You might say, as Sully sort of does, that side-stick tech was also an accident looking for a place to happen. Panic, as we know, might turn an otherwise competent pilot to mush. And it's hard to simulate in training or testing. So we look to systems as backstops for HF failings.

Why not, Skippy? Anyway, let's hope it's a moot point soon. I recently came across one guy with considerable industry experience who reckoned it'd never happen because ATC folks wanted no part of allowing swarms of amateurs to invade their airspace. But then, the other day, I heard an RAAus instructor say that the Syllabus for the endo was all done and dusted (by RAAus) and was now just awaiting final approval by the authorities.

Mainly just by being exposed to that recent reporting (above) and the sense that those findings must have been arrived at seriously and judiciously. But I've probably also been influenced by a re-read of contributions to this very thread from fourteen years ago. Notably, Nev, some of your own.

Yes. Anyway, personally, I'm beginning to see where the case against the manufacturer - and airline - has merit and where the case against the pilots is less open-and-shut.

This article adds some detail about the Paris Appeals Court process: Airbus and Air France convicted over AF447 disaster after appeal court overturns acquittal | ICLG ICLG.COM Seventeen years after an Air France flight plunged into the Atlantic killing 228 people, a Paris court has found Airbus and Air France responsible. Excerpt: The appeal "Unlike the appellate process in England and other common law jurisdictions, the French appeal effectively took the form of a complete retrial, lasting eight weeks and revisiting the evidence from scratch, including technical expert testimony, pilot training procedures and Airbus’s knowledge of earlier incidents involving pitot tube malfunctions. Prosecutors argued that Airbus had underestimated the dangers posed by unreliable airspeed data and failed to respond quickly enough to known defects affecting the sensors. Air France, meanwhile, was accused of failing adequately to train pilots to respond to high-altitude loss-of-speed warnings and autopilot disengagement scenarios. Lawyers for the victims’ families said the companies had spent years attempting to blame the deceased pilots while downplaying their own institutional shortcomings. The defence maintained that the crash ultimately resulted from unforeseeable pilot actions inside the cockpit. Airbus also pointed to earlier procedural decisions, including the 2023 acquittal, arguing that criminal liability had never been properly established. The decision The court concluded that both companies bore criminal responsibility for failures that contributed directly to the crash. It found that Air France had failed adequately to prepare pilots for the precise emergency encountered on AF447, while Airbus had not fully appreciated or addressed the risks associated with pitot tube failures."