Roundsounds

You got the Luton Major!! The one in the foreground is a Stitts Payboy. I watched both of these aircraft during finally assembly at Camden when I was a young hangar rat. Managed to go for a ride in both, later in life I did a flight review for one of the Luton’s owners and had a fly of it - very Tiger Moth like to fly.

I sat in the backseat on a number of flights in the Horizon when I was a young lad, the gear and flap were operated by a single handle. Gear and flap were wound either up or down, you could not separate their operation. If you ever see one departing you can tell when the pilot has started retracting the gear by the pitching/rolling induced by the pilot while he winds the gear/flap up.

Bonus points if you can name the orange and white aircraft in the background too.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4930550/199805459.pdf

There have been a number of Tigers suffer engine failures as the result of the prorective coating on the cork float in the carburettor cracking. The crack allows fuel to enter the cork, as the engine warms it causes the coating to expand and can make the float stick and lead to a rich or lean situation. Very hard to identify if the aircraft has caught fire. There is a well documented accident in Qld explaining this fault, It would be very easy to attribute this type of failure to carb ice. ATSB report.

There have been a number of Tigers suffer engine failures as the result of the prorective coating on the cork float in the carburettor cracking. The crack allows fuel to enter the cork, as the engine warms it causes the coating to expand and can make the float stick and lead to a rich or lean situation. Very hard to identify if the aircraft has caught fire. There is a well documented accident in WA explaining this fault, I’ll try to find the report. It would be very easy to attribute this type of failure to carb ice. The WA accident report says it is a know fault observed by people performing overhauls, yet no AD issued. I will not fly Tigers any longer as a result, the last endorsement I knocked back had an unexplained engine failure on takeoff resulting in an off field landing and damage.

This is actually a very poor video for the following reasons: - he introduces the PARE spin recovery technique before commencing the demos, but never mentions the A (aileron) during any of the recoveries. If you enter a spin and not centre the ailerons you will likely not recover (aircraft type dependent). - he continually refers to airspeed being the primary factor in stalling - it’s angle of attack, you can stall / spin from any airspeed. - he introduces a non standard method of using roll to identify which rudder to apply during spin recovery. This will kill you if you try this method with inverted spinning. The only way to reliably identify the direction of rotation is yaw, best way is to sight down the nose of the aircraft. I agree that looking at the balance ball is unrealistic unless in IMC. - he never mentions removing the opposite rudder when the spin rotation stops. Leaving full rudder in will cause some aircraft to spin in the opposite direction, some will flick into an inverted spin if you also hold the forward stick in too. The Yak 52 being a great example. If you’re going to produce a training video on a topic it must be done correctly. In this case give the full recovery method and apply all steps through to established back in the climb. It is very difficult to retrain people who have been taught incorrect techniques, teach the correct ones from the outset. In summary; - it’s angle of attack not airspeed leading to stall / spins. - Use all steps of an acceptable procedure every time, especially when instructing. - don’t try to make up your own recovery tips without thinking them through and doing some research. (Using roll to identify which rudder to use) On the positive side, I agree with his scenario based entry method by simulating an overshoot onto final.

Ask your instructor to provide you with a copy of the syllabus, this includes theory knowledge and exams.

Maybe ELAAA, SAAA and AOPA could form a partnership of some sort? That’d sort out the level playing field issues AOPA have with RAA. What could possibly go wrong...

going places in a Yak 52 will be a pain. They hold 120 litres, use 12 for warmup / takeoff the burn about 60 litres per hour, which provides and endurance of 108 mins. Take your 30 mins off that and you’re left with 78 mins @ say 120 kts nil wind. Allow 10 mins for approach and you’ve got about 135 NM range nil wind. I’ve landed many times with both 12 litres lights flashing, which would mean under the new rules I’d need to call a Fuel Mayday. I don’t know if any Yak 52s having suffered from fuel exhaustion. Yak pilots are aware of the limitations and plan accordingly.

Whatever you do don’t tell them your gauges aren’t accurate. Just make up something and keep it in a folder undated. If you’re doing local operations or training, 30 mins is plenty for reserves.

Thank goodness, we should all feel so much safer now these new rules are in place. You’ll never see another Australian aircraft run out of fuel again. Much better to legislate than educate pilots. Particularly when the statistics show the incidence of fuel exhaustion have been steadily decreasing for the past 15 years and the bulk of incidents have involved commercial operators who have had mandated fuel reserves as part of their operations manual.

CAR 206 defines commercial purposes and applies to RAAus operations. Based on this information there should be no reason you cannot use an RAAus aircraft for the purposes you have described. CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS 1988 - REG 206 Commercial purposes (Act, s 27(9))

I’ve got a Piper J3 Cub, no batteries to worry about.

That’s why the correct term is “periodic inspection”. It will in most cases occur at the earliest of 100 hours or 12 months. The only time this may vary would be in accordance with the manufacturers schedule.

Yes, it gives great peace of mind knowing this extensive testing has been done. I’ve done a lot of spin training in Chippies over the years. I always provide students with a copy of the TNS well before we fly. We then take some time to discuss the published entry, maintenance and recovery technique before flying and never enter a spin below 5000’ AGL. I’m amazed at the number of pilots and instructors who recite a spin revovery technique omitting any mention of throttle or aileron. When I mention throttle / aileron some respond with blank looks, other say of course I would make the appropriate adjustments. I was recently doing some Upset recovery training with a professional pilot who didn’t understand the concept of “unloading”. He was adamant you must pull back on the control column to un-stall when inverted as it lowered the nose relative to the horizon! He couldn’t get the concept that angle of attack is in no way related to pitch attitude relative to the horizon!

The spin strakes and wide chord rudder on the DHC-1 were proven to have next to no effect on the spin. DeHavilland produced a TNS (effectively an AD) providing operators with information on spinning the Chippy. This was produced not long after the aircraft was put on the Australian register and a few of them spun in. An Australian registered aircraft was extensively tested (VH-RSV, which was also registered as CBM, AFG, WAU and ZIT at various times in its life). Bottom line was, start at a safe height, use the manufacturers recovery technique and you’ll be safe.

A good friend and former work colleague of mine was killed in that accident. He was a very diligent commercial pilot under instruction. The problem with gliders preparing to takeoff being you cannot see directly behind and rely on hand signals from persons outside the cockpit and radio transmissions from other traffic to establish you are clear of traffic when launching. The pilot’s wife tells me the other glider’s radio was U/S and the signal given said all clear.

Accident investigation may be limited by financial constraints The data analysis and training are a matter of lack of expertise or willingness to accept offers of assistance from those with the exerpience.

The LSA POH seems to contain a different procedure...

There are a couple of fundamental flaws in the RAAus safety system: 1. Those responsible for the development of procedures, training syllabus and other facets related to producing a safe operating system are also the same people who investigate incidents. This has the potential to bias the investigation process / findings. I’m not suggesting any deliberate manipulation of findings, but they’re may be blind to the deficiencies in their systems. There needs to be an independent set of fresh eyes looking into incidents. 2. There is no apparent analysis of incident data, directing people to review the incident data base and come to their own conclusions as to how to they might avoid having the same issue is wrong. There is no need to publsh individual incident reports for all and sundry to see. Proper analysis of data will reveal problem areas in operations. This information can then be used to develop appropriate training to reduce incident rates. People don’t go flying with the intention of hurting themselves, it’s generally the result of a lack of awareness or poor skills - these can be corrected with proper training. I recently saw the logbook of a pilot who had just passed his RPC flight test. His whole 20 odd hours training consisted circuits according to the entries in his logbook! RAAus should publish a syllabus of training, at present there is a table of competencies but not a syllabus. Student need to be aware of what their training path looks like and be actively involved in planning it, this is a basic adult learning principle. A lot of information is hidden in a CFI portal. This should be shared with all pilots rather than the old “knowledge is power” approach, that went out years ago thank goodness.

Interesting recovery technique, but no doubt developed as the result of Flight testing. The method of only making any pitch input after rotation stops is unusual, given the design of the tail I would have thought a pitch down would assist in providing airflow over the rudder and may be required to stop the rotation.