Oscar

Andy, you can bet the farm that I have considered that in my vote for a NSW rep. - but once again, I have to say that I think the idea of regional representation vs skill set representation is now past its use-by date. I'm NSW, but damn it, if the best set of skills all comes from SQ, then so be it.

 

 

I do not agree with some of the posters on this forum that board members need in-depth technical knowledge of the aviation industry. A knowledge of good governance and management (which could be learned on the job), a passion for recreational aviation and common sense would be enough. Technical expertise can be imported, by the Board, as required. Skill based boards while desirable are not absolutely necessary if a cohesive board and management team can be assembled.

Pete, that is a very good summary of the ideal situation. The best managers I have ever worked with were the ones that understood the scope of the operations that needed to be undertaken and the skills set(s) needed to perform them and who could assess (and also select by assessment) the competence of their staff to undertake those tasks. Then they basically communicated downwards any relevant strategic directions that needed to be taken into account, monitored the performance of their jurisdiction and basically supported their staff in achieving the objectives of the corporation/unit. Of course, they also communicated upwards on any matters affecting the ability of their unit to achieve its requirements and goals.

 

That said - RAA is required to operate in a heavily technical area in compliance with a complex set of rules. It does require that Board members appreciate the complexity of those rules - not necessarily chapter and verse to act as auditors of staff performance, but to understand the framework within which their staff are performing their duties. We must not, for instance, have a repetition of a Technical Manager being pressured to accept registration of an aircraft with weight limits contrary to the requirements - and that has happened.

 

So, there needs to be at least a decent balance on the Board of people with various areas of expertise who can recognise the requirements placed on the organisation and steer its strategic directions. I have worked in a number of organisations run by a Board/Council, and the best of those always had operational matters presented by the operational staff so they understood the full gamut of the situations and then made informed decisions on strategic policy in the complete knowledge of all requirements that constrained such activity. Compliance with the 'governance' requirements is only one facet of the skills we need on the Board - we also need people with a keen appreciation of the technical complexity of our environment who can support the work of the staff who have to ensure compliance with the rules.

 

 

I think you miss the point again - I saw the test performed, it was not a document, it was a real, practical test conducted in Berwick, Victoria, and for a completely unrelated purpose, interestingly. As far as I know it was not documented it was done to prove a point, just like this one. I have told you how to conduct this very simple test and I have told you the results that I saw from the test I saw conducted. You say "I personally rely on scientifically justifiable testing" when in fact you quote a paper related to theory of 'large structures'. If you want results from testing, then test it! It's very simple to do. If you want to accelerate the test then heat the water. If you want to accelerate the (semi-permeable membrane) test further, then use rock salt instead of balsa to increase the concentration difference across the membrane. This is basic schoolboy stuff that yields accurate real-world results Oscar, not 'unsupported assertions'.

I see neither profit nor point from debating this further. There is any amount of credible information on the relative permeability of epoxy resins: Google: epoxy resin water permeability . None that I have seen supports your contention that 'epoxy is one of the worst'. Those people who wish to acquaint themselves with the information readily available can easily do so, and hopefully will.

 

 

I don't need to go data mining, I have seen the results of quantitative tests.

For the sake of information of value to forum members, can you please provide the results? I personally rely on scientifically justifiable testing, rather than unsupported assertions.

 

 

The point of quoting that paper was that the rate of moisture transmission through an epoxy covering is sufficiently slow that normal prop bolt torque checking should be entirely adequate to prevent excessive crushing of the hub from normal humidity changes.

 

I agree that epoxy is not impervious to moisture; however I have referenced a very thoroughly-researched paper that places the effects in perspective. You stated that 'epoxy is one of the worst' for moisture transmission; I ask you to validate this statement by reference to equivalently authoritative documentation.

 

While it is not germaine to this thread, I have also been involved in osmosis remediation of boat hulls, including for Swanson, Adams, Benetau and Riveria boats. As a result of seeing the osmosis damage to those boats, I would personally never use gel-coat as a water-barrier medium, I would use a 2-pot polyurethane finish every time. The moisture ingress on the Riveria, in particular, through the gel-coat required 2mm of the outer laminate to be mechanically ground off and over 6 months of drying time required before a new outer later of epoxy laminate could be applied. I have personally sheathed a double-diagonal Kauri-planked 48' foot ex-trawler in epoxy laminate ( around 250 litres of WEST 205 required). That boat is still doing just fine, thank you, 15 years later - with its 2-pot poly paint barrier coating in excellent condition.

 

 

so I'd guess that epoxy is used to sheath the prop and epoxy is one of the worst for moisture transfer.

May I refer you to: Assessment of Research Needs for Wind Turbine Rotor Materials Technology ( 1991 ) http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1824&page=54 :

 

Moisture effects are modified for wood/epoxy laminate to the extent that the epoxy seals out liquid water entirely and is a fairly effective barrier to the passage of moisture in the form of water vapor. As a result, a large structure will not respond to the short-term moisture fluctuations in its environment, but will instead come to equilibrium with the average humidity over a period of months to years (Figure 3-7)

 

You may also not be aware that gelcoat is water-permeable, and the typical 'blistering' bubbles on polyester hulled boats is almost always a result of the passage of moisture through the gelcoat reacting with uncured areas of resin due to poor mixing techniques / layup in high-humidity conditions ( Swanson yachts were particularly prone to this), with the bad osmosis softening areas being a result of wicking of the water down the matrix/resin interface.

 

 

deleted - moderator

 

 

RAA-class aircraft (or indeed any aircraft) that require Belleville washer packs to achieve the necessary flange/propellor pressure to keep it within the friction coefficient for operation under normal operating conditions, is information available to the operator. Should you be wrenching any of those, you'd need to do it in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements. The manufacturers do not just derive such arrangements by thrusting a wet thumb in the air, they test (exhaustively, and in a fully documented way) the results of testing in calibrated facilities. You may well be amazed that 'I've always done it this way, and it hasn't failed me yet' is not considered adequate proof for certificating authorities. No doubt they do not have your experience to draw upon. (edited ...moderator)

 

 

ll new to me and specific to Jab props as I see it. I ran wood props for years on a selection of different engines including opposed 4 cyl 4 strokes, never heard of using washers like that before, and all my props suffered no damage like those on the Jabs. In fact I still have them and they are in perfect shape.

If you don't know what a Beleville washer is, and what its function is, then your credentials as a fount of knowledge is seriously degraded. The use of the Beleville pack and the resultant torque figures for the 2200 props was determined by an engineer who obviously knows the effect of torque pulses and the characteristics of wood in the presence of varying conditions of moisture content and relative humidity of which you are totally, and noisily, completely ignorant.

 

 

While the impact of implementing an SMS for individual FTFs is in no way minimal, it is worth considering the offsetting benefits.

 

Demonstrable adherence to an accepted standard of performance is a very significant defence against a legal challenge of negligence. In our litigious society, a provider of goods or services is squarely in the firing line for legal redress of grievance. If no standard of performance is available, then it can come down to the opinion of the Court in the case of a claim that the provider of goods or services failed in anticipating a risk involved and therefore may beheld to be liable for compensation for injuries/death /property loss etc.

 

This is NOT a trivial matter: RAA has recently been involved in a court case because of its lack of adherence to standards that has cost well over one half a million dollars in legal fees alone.

 

The aircraft we all fly, are available to us through the adherence to standards. In the USA, the light aviation manufacturing industry was all but wiped out because of the problems of litigation. I venture to suggest that no RAA FTF can afford to exist if it is 'on its own' in having to prove that it adequately prepared a trainee for all foreseeable risks involved in flying. No insurance company is going to provide professional indemnity insurance for an entirely open-ended risk scenario, so any training would have to depend on the legal validity of a declaration by the trainee that they accept all and any risk of flying, now and in the future. And that, in its turn, would not be worth squat until tested in a Court, that such a declaration absolves the training organisation of all responsibility.

 

The existence of a standard is an explicit statement of the required level of performance - in this case by an FTF. It removes from the FTF the obligation of having to determine and train for situations that it may not have considered likely or even possible. It provides the FTF with the legal defence that, having demonstrably met the required standard, it has discharged its legal obligations to the student.

 

An SMS does not surplant good training. An SMS is absolutely no guarantee that pilots will still not make bad decisions. However, it IS another weapon in the armoury of having us continue to be able to aviate in the RAA-class regime. Do not dismiss its value just because of its cost.

 

 

From what I have seen, the only channel of reporting accidents in RAA has been the page in Sport Pilot. If one accepts that this is a publication intended to promote RAA activity to the general public (and I acknowledge the value of that), then the scant details could be regarded as consistent with the intent of the publication. However, it does not, in any real way, provide useful information to RAA members.

 

Accident investigation requires forensic skills. Let me give an example: the (fatal) crash of a Thorpe T4 some years ago, that flew in a gentle descent on full power into the ground. The pilot was a currently-rated and medically-checked airline pilot. The investigator, called in to help by the local Police in preparing their report for the Coroner, found a small crack in the floor immediately behind the exhaust exit, and was aware of the fact that a Thorpe T4 has negative pressure in the cabin, thus sucking in CO. He asked for a supplementary autopsy report to check for CO in the corpse's blood - that was found. The pilot was either dead, or at least comatose, well before the aircraft hit the ground.

 

The FULL information regarding the causes of accidents is very much needed - and it should not be redacted because it might be thought to be prejudicial to the cause of RAA aviating. If you are the pilot flying a Gazelle - do you NEED to know that the loads on the lift struts reverse beyond a certain airspeed/ loading? Bloody hell, you do, if you want to keep on living. Do you need to know that a hard landing in your Technam could have compromised the undercarriage bolts? - how much are you prepared to pay out in insurance excess when the u/c subsequently fails? Do you, as a Sting owner, need to know that in certain circumstances, the completely inadequate shoulder harness fittings will fail and smash your head against the panel ? Your widow and fatherless children might have liked you to know that and taken appropriate action in an emergency.

 

OK, perhaps RAA needs to keep its dirtier information away from the gaze of the general public for the sake of its public profile- but that information needs to be collected and be available to members. Only by having access to information, can we make informed decisions.

 

 

Oscar, who are you, what do you fly ?..............you've only been with us since March 2013, you do seem to be overly sensitive on matters that mention CASA.........................Maj...

Maj, who I am is immaterial, what I will fly when it's back together is a Jab. Almost all of my entire flying experience has been in gliders, and back in the day I used to hold a DoT Airworthiness Authority for C of A's and minor repairs on 'glass and metal. My 'recent' upsurge of interest in this forum is a direct result of acquiring an interest in a somewhat broken Jab. and while trying to find out the hoops required to be jumped through having to deal with four different Technical Managers: Steve Bell, then Dean Tompkins, then Adam Finn and now Wayne Matthews, in extremely rapid succession. As you will know, two of those Tech. Managers left the RAA in unexplained circumstances and in what was extremely unseemingly haste, and that sparked a note of extreme caution in my appreciation of the stability and competence of the organisation. I need hardly add that WAY too many other things have happened in the last twelve months that have reinforced my apprehensions.

 

As for being 'overly sensitive' on matters that mention CASA: I am not and never have been in any way associated with CASA but my immediate family has made its living for many, many years dealing with CASA on an almost daily basis. There are a number of individuals in CASA that I would not use as lining on a cocky's cage - but that is not the point. You may have seen in some of my posts on threads in this forum area, my extreme desire to see RAA continue and not be subsumed by CASA because it is apparently unable to administer its sector of aviating.

 

The point is this: CASA has the authority. For better or worse, it was long ago decided that some 'body' was needed to protect the safety of 'the people' both when flying in things and from having flying things drop on their heads. Whatever the merits of having a federal authority vs. any other sort of authority, 'the people' (apparently) demanded that 'the government should DO something' about these flying things, and by a diverse route we now have CASA. Hate it or want to hit it with a shovel - we can't just ignore it. It exists, it has legislative responsibilities and concomitant powers - and we have to live with that.

 

That fact is what is known as 'realpolitik', and mouthing off against it is mostly fruitless. Aviators are a very minority group in Australian society; in order to remove CASA from our own sphere of activity would require changing the political will of the majority of the electorate - and good luck with that. I worked in the Commonwealth Public Service for 27 years before going into private industry and I've been on the receiving end of Ministerial demands for 'explanations' of things that some agitated peanut voter has referred to the Minister's office that gets taken seriously by the Minister. I've seen the intense work of dozens of intelligent, hard-working people trying to instill some sense and clarity into legislation/administration of the business of government ignored / overturned due to one piece of bad publicity and a few hysterical responses from ill-informed but 'concerned' people demanding that 'the government should DO something about this'. Never, never underestimate the sway over Ministers of any matter that they might perceive as being 'bad' for their political survival, nor their capacity to grasp an ill-considered and sometimes stupid response that gets them off the hook of the moment. An instruction from the Minister's office to 'fix this' is rarely one that means 'make this better' - it usually means 'make this go away'.

 

Unless the entire sphere of RAA operations can be excised from CASA's jurisdiction, we are forced to operate under its authority. Therefore, while that situation exists, I believe it is pointless to simply fulminate against CASA. The RAA needs to operate in a way that does not attract CASA's undesired attention - and that it has palpably failed to do in recent years. If we could operate 'under the radar' of public attention, we would be left alone to get on with it. That is the situation I would like to see RAA achieve.

 

 

The SMS and similar type systems are set up by governments and entities like CASA, not to attack the problems straight on, but to appear as though they have.They can then say "well we required them to instigate a SMS system , so it's not our fault , we did our bit" while not really doing much to eliminate the danger at all.

This is such a piece of a) cynical, and b) short-sighted commentary, that it hardly beggars commentary. However, lest it be taken as intelligence it needs a response.

 

No system will eliminate willful stupidity. No regulation intended to prevent foreseeable eventualities will succeed in the face of willful non-observance. No amount of peer-pressure good advice will prevent willful disregard. How many experienced aviators were present at Natfly last year when a couple took off at last light - and died shortly thereafter?

 

What an SMS WILL do, is assist in the prevention of accidents resulting from genuine lack of knowledge. By at least reducing the 'unknown' danger factors, aviators have better information on which to base their decisions. Ultimately, the decision to take off, to press on into adverse conditions, to attempt to land, is up to the PIC - but at least, if provided with the best-available information, their choice to take an action is at the least, an informed one.

 

The principle of accessibility to critical information is well-established. For instance, Material Safety Data Sheets are provided for a vast range of products, so that users can be aware of any dangers inherent in using that product. You can argue that this is another version of 'arse-covering' - but those sheets allow end-users to at least be aware of any risks they take in using the product. You cannot buy a ladder without a placard that says; 'do not step above this height - you may lose your balance' - yet around 20 deaths and over 1,000 injuries a year are related to ladders.

 

Users of ladders are not regarded by society as 'risk-takers'. However - how often do you see a report in the media of a death from a ladder accident? Yet every fatality - or even incident - regarding an aircraft gets media attention.

 

The bottom line is: our activity NEEDS an effective SMS, to demonstrate that we are, as a group, not just aware but pro-active in trying to improve our safety standards. We NEED a demonstrable standard by which the actions of the individual can be judged to be either consistent or inconsistent with a reasonable expressed standard of safety. If you wish to call this 'arse-covering', you are entitled to so do - but if you want to beable to enjoy the support of the general community for things like saving local airports from developers, then we NEED the 'arse-covering' of expressed safety standards with which to defend our activities from the prejudice of a community response that we all a pack of death-wish loonies that they don't want near their community.

 

OK, call it 'arse-covering'. However, without it, we stand a very real chance of having our arses run out of too many towns because 'the local community' doesn't believe we are a safe and reasonable activity in their locale. It isn't just CASA's imperative at work here - it's our survival.

 

 

Many people are being polite, compassionate, sympathetic and extremely restrained in their comments. Now let's cut to the chase.

 

Under the (mostly) current Board, RAA has:

 

• failed to meet its contracted obligations under the Deed of Agreement, not just for one year but repeatedly;
   
   
  
• failed to keep its acceptance of aircraft for registration to the required standards;
   
   
  
• accepted documentation of acceptability/weight limitations outside accordance with the regulations;
   
   
  
• registered aircraft that had NO acceptable certification documentation;
   
   
  
• accepted aircraft registration classification as 'factory-built' when they were not.
   
   
  

 

 

The above are not trivial matters: people have died in situations when they should not have even been in those situations. This is not an emotive charge, it is a fact.

 

We have aircraft grounded, aircraft purchased that have no definite future of flying, aircraft that were believed to be, by their purchasers, to be two-seat usable that now are found to be single-seat only, if you want to go further than a circuit or two. We have aircraft that were acceptable for training that are now useless for that purpose. We have FTFs that cannot operate.

 

In addition: RAA has:

 

• failed to meet its financial reporting obligations;
   
   
  
• been placed in a situation where it has had NO nominated Executive presence, required for the discharge of its responsibilities under its Constitution;
   
   
  
• acted completely outside the rules of its Constitution;
   
   
  
• expended very considerable amounts of members' money on court cases that should never have come to pass.
   
   
  

 

 

In recent times, a certain member of the Board has unilaterally removed from the Operations Manual HP and LP and Human Factors against all other advice. This, in a year when RAA-class aviation fatal accident statistics has climbed disastrously.

 

That the past operation of RAA has opened the floodgates of CASA being reduced to threatening to withhold its subsidy to the organisation under the Deed of Agreement is not conjecture - it is a fact.

 

RAA stands on the cusp of either: having a management team capable of discharging its obligations, or being subsumed into the CASA-controlled VH-reg. milieu. I'm sorry, but the 'oopsy, we stuffed up' days are history - and bad history at that- and anybody clinging to the idea that a gentle nudge to the current mode of operation will suffice to keep RAA operating, is deluded.

 

There is a saying: 'if it aint broke, don't fix it'. RAA is broke, and it needs fixing.

 

 

Middo put a bend in the pollies of the day to start a movement called "AUF" that name may not be correct however good enough fot this story.

What an amazing revision of history! The AUF was formed in 1983, as a re-named Australian Ultralight Association originally formed in 1982, Middleton was employed by CAA (now CASA) until 1994.

 

 

The only plausible reason for someone resigning and then nominating for the same position is to be able to say: 'well I left it up to the Board, and I was re-elected: choke on that'. I have not seen ONE word regarding the reasons for Middleton resigning. This is, pure and simple, political manouevering at its most venal.

 

Middleton has done the RAA great service in broadening its appeal. For that, I applaud him. However, the end result of his lack of attention/downright disdain for compliance issues is laid bare to the bone now. Whipping up a mob does not always result in good ends; it is beyond time that RAA moved beyond a scramble for size and became an organisation that can work effectively for the aviating future of its members. That clock is ticking.

 

 

Since we have had - as far as I know - NO explanation of the reasons for Middleton's resignation, this has the absolute stench of political manouevering. How in any god's name could that be considered to be 'to allow the system to work'? RAA was left with NO group responsible, under the Constitution, to carry out its day-to-day operations. An absolute abrogation of responsibility to the members for the sake of personal ego.

 

I have always believed in the value of corporate knowledge to any organisation. However, it is frankly impossible to view the events of the last six months in regard to the performance of a considerable number of the Board members to be anything less than a bloody disgrace for an organisation that has the responsibility for the operation of a sector of aviation in this country as anything less than a rolling disaster, and hence to believe that nothing other than a tectonic change in the Board composition is essential for our forward existence. We need a Board with the propensity (willingness plus ability) to discharge those responsibilities.

 

Other than the few who contribute to this forum of members are likely to comprehend the degree of change that is needed. I exhort those who DO understand this, to communicate with everybody in RAA they know, to help install a Board that will be capable of resolving the miasma in which we are now placed. It's OUR future aviating that is at stake.

 

 

Every time a small(ish) but useful regional area strip gets crowded out by development, thank John Anderson. How a Country Party (under whatever name it was at the time) member could have sold out the protection of a viable aviation presence in a community to the venal interests of local Councils is beyond me, and as the road infrastructure continues to deteriorate, especially in Queensland following repeated flooding, the availability of a strip to serve the local community will be more and more keenly felt.

 

 

Yes but Daffyd, most of those many parts on the Drifters have a habit of continuing to work........Maj... watch out !

Oh, FFS, what parallel universe do you inhabit? The quality of construction on the Drifters, Thrusters etc. 'continues to work' because they are the aeronautical equivalent of billycarts. I've done extensive refurbishment on a Thruster and I would not put my children in a sailing dinghy out on the Bay with fittings of that quality. As George Markey - who was working in the same hangar at the time, said to me: 'it doesn't matter, because they're so slow, they don't generally manage to get to the scene of the accident when it happens'.

 

That's fine for people who are happy to tinker with their wires and bungee cords rather than go from Point A to Point B. If you have no more desire than to spend time on a weekend looking around a paddock from the ground while you fiddle with your aerial deckchair, so that you can spend 20 minutes looking at the paddock from an elevated position - well, good luck to you. I wish you well, and safe and happy flying. I ride a motorcycle for pleasure, so I understand the allure of 'just toddling along, enjoying the moment'.

 

However, a lot of RAA-class aircraft owners want to use their aircraft as a means to another end: visiting places that would be otherwise be denied them, perhaps engaging in their occupation. Their aircraft is not an end in itself - it is a tool to achieve the end they seek. It is not, for them, 'the journey', but the destination achieved that is important. They need to be assured that from the time of hitting the starter button to the time of shutting down, the aircraft has performed as expected.

 

It's the difference between owing a vintage car for the pleasure of tinkering with it, to traveling for the purpose of experiencing a new location. It's why the Toyota Camry is the world's best-selling motor vehicle vs. a Morgan Plus 4.

 

And it's why Jabiru have sold thousands of aircraft. How many Drifters are there on the register?

 

 

If Casino was one of the 98 airports included in the ALOP scheme where they were 'given' to local government by the Commonwealth to control under a perpetual lease - then the owner is not allowed to divert land on that airport away from aviation use. Worth looking into whether the 'sale' of this airport land is legally sound. I doubt it is, but....happy days,

John Anderson (the patron saint of gifts to local Councils) action, very late in the day of his time as Minister for Transport etc. , was one of the most detrimental actions for the future of aviation in this country of all time. There is far too little activity from aviation groups (including RAA) to promote the value to communities of having good landing facilities available to them and so local Councils can get away with flogging off airstrips to gain cheap rates $$ (let alone the opportunities for corruption from developers). Unless the Council electorate rates such availability highly enough, aviation facilities will not be on their radar and this sort of encroaching and eventually stifling development will continue to happen.Having what most of the local electorate thinks of as 'rich kids' toys' crash amongst the houses doesn't help one jot.

 

 

Yes, I don't dispute the necessity of having fair and reasonable rules for such matters at all - but the lack of thought for basic governance issues is what does trouble me. Yet - it's extremely typical.

 

An example: some years ago, I was a consultant to one of Australia's major Universities - one of the 'Group of 8'. I was tasked with examining and developing a policy for Intellectual Property control - absolute basic stuff for a University that was one of Australia's major Research institutions, and that underpinned quite literally multi-millions of $$ worth of Research Grants each year, not to mention its potential income capacity from patentable discoveries from research. This institution had an annual turn-over of in excess of half a BILLION dollars each year.

 

When I looked at the existing arrangements, I found two paragraphs covering Intellectual Property rights - and FIVE PAGES devoted to the rules for applying for an on-campus Parking Permit. Seriously: I.P. rights governed the entire regime for delivering on-line education, let alone income potential. However, obviously those who had defined the rules for the organisation were more concerned with protecting their ability to park near their office than trying to generate reasonable income for the institution!

 

My point is simply this: the current Constitution for RAA does not provide adequate, considered mechanisms for 'good governance' to handle anything beyond management carried out to the best possible level. Once that has descended into the sort of chaos we are currently experiencing, it is an 'emergency' situation. Hence, my use of the term 'imploding' - as things stand, we have painted a target on our backs for CASA to state that we are not an effective organisation to handle the management of the exemptions under which RAA-class aviation operates. At the best we can hope for a level of tolerance from CASA to get this situation sorted - but if we do NOT demonstrate the capability of transcending the current situation, then we are, frankly, suicidal in terms of RAA's future existence.

 

 

When looking at the Constitution, I found it interesting that a great deal of time and effort went into the drafting of things like the handling of Disciplinary matters, yet very little - and all of that as far as I can see extremely formulaic in nature - went into actual 'governance' matters. I imagine it was presumed that 'good governance' would, in the main, result from good will and competent sensible management by those with that responsibility.

 

That's not an unreasonable expectation - but as we now see, when things suddenly slip outside the bounds of 'reasonable' expectation, there is no defined mechanism for handling the situation. As you say, about the only path forward is for things to be done that are technically not handled within the Constitution, and assume that whatever results will be acceptable in the short term and 'ratified' - however that is to come about - in the slightly longer. By any objective measure, that places the current management situation of RAA in 'emergency' mode i.e. in a situation where action NOT consistent with its Constitution has to be adopted.

 

We HAVE to accept this - but we should, I believe, be working our collective butts off to get things back under duly constituted control both as quickly as possible and in a manner that is a demonstrable advancement on the management and governance circumstances that has led us down this path. Despite the fact that RAA-class aviation is something way outside the mainstream of things that are part of daily life for society generally, all we need is for some tragic accident to happen plus parts of the media shouting things such as 'Ultralight aircraft management in crisis, out of control' or similar and we WILL become the focus of attention, with potentially serious implications: such attention is almost never helpful..

 

 

We know of Ed Herring's reasons - but I feel that RAA members are owed a decent (and convincing) explanation from Middleton, who has effectively dumped the organisation in the deep merde, head downwards, while retaining his power base as a Board member.

 

I find it difficult to believe that this is anything other than a deeply cynical and manipulative move from the (ex)-Secretary, to get himself out from under the weight of ordure amassing, and as a Member from his region I most assuredly will NOT be voting for his continuation on the Board - we deserve better than this!.

 

 

OK, now can anyone tell us how RAA now escapes - while remaining compliant with its Constitution - from the apparent Catch-22 situation of: (bolding has been added by me)

 

a) the Executive shall be responsible for all matters relating to the affairs of the Association whenever the

 

Board is not meeting and, subject to any decisions of the Board, shall make all the

 

decisions necessary in relation to the Association's business and shall act in the case of

 

emergency.

 

plus:

 

b) No business shall be transacted by the Board unless a quorum is present and if within half

 

an hour after the time appointed for the meeting a quorum is not present, the meeting

 

stands adjourned to a place and time to be determined.

 

when:

 

c) Any seven (7) Members of the Board including at least two members of the Executive

 

shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the meeting of the Board.

 

It seems, prima facie, that without 'the Executive' - or at least two members thereof - the RAA cannot conduct business between Board meetings, nor can it hold a Board meeting!

 

 

Mark Clayton, GM, has been appointed Public Officer.

Apologies, that is indeed correct (assuming it was a valid appointment! - the way things have gone in the past few weeks, perhaps nothing should be taken for granted! - but for the sake of the organisation, let us all hope it is kosher).